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PARENTAL NOTIFICATION PRIOR TO ABORTION: IS
MINNESOTA'S STATUTE CONSISTENT WITH
CURRENT STANDARDS
The United States Supreme Court recently heard a case, Hartigan v. Zbaraz,
which could have determined the constitutionality of statutes requiring parental
notice prior to abortion. However, the eight-member Court issued a split deci-
sion without an opinion. A Minnesota statute, similar to the Illinois statute at
issue in Zbaraz, has been reviewed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hodgson v. State. This Note contrasts the two statutes and discusses the content
of parental notfication statutes in light of the few Supreme Court decisions that
have some bearing on the issue. The author suggests revisions of Minnesota's
Act. The Note concludes that both the Illinois and Minnesota statutes must be
scrutinized by the Supreme Court in order to completely set the parameters for
parental notification.
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INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade' in
1973, many aspects of the extent to which states could regulate abor-
tion remained unanswered. 2 One significant area left void of regula-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Issues involved in state regulation include whether a state may require
spousal or parental consent, require hospitalization for the procedure or require a
waiting period before obtaining the procedure. See infra note 67 for a review of the
Supreme Court's attempts at abortion regulation.
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tory standards has been the regulation of abortion with respect to
minors.
The regulation of health care for minors differs somewhat from
that of adults. 3 Both adults and minors need to be protected from
the risks of medical procedures. Judicial proceedings that apply to
minors must also protect them from public exposure and from po-
tential familial conflicts. 4 These potentially diverging considerations
must be balanced by legislatures and courts in determining the ex-
tent to which minors' access to abortions may be constrained.
The Supreme Court has concluded that statutory requirements of
parental notification or consent before allowing a minor to obtain an
abortion are constitutional.5 The Court, however, has not ruled de-
finitively on the parameters of those requirements, particularly with
regard to prior parental notice. 6 The lack of firmly articulated stan-
dards has left lower courts with a tenuous framework with which to
interpret parental consent/notification statutes. 7 State legislatures
have been without guidance in their attempts to balance the compet-
ing interests of protection and regulation of juveniles regarding
abortions .8
Recently, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to
clarify the extent to which states may burden a minor's right to an
abortion in Hartigan v. Zbaraz,9 a case from the Seventh Circuit.lO
The Supreme Court, however, was split in its decision, I I leaving reg-
ulation in the area uncertain. In Hodgson v. State,12 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals enjoined Minnesota's statute requiring parental
3. See infra notes 71-77 and 93-98 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 100-40 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 255-57, 277-92, 297-303 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the lack of agreement in parental notification/consent statutes.
7. See Note, Zbaraz v. Hartigan: Mandatory Twenty-Four Hour Waiting Period After
Parental Notification Unconstitutionally Burdens A Minor's Abortion Decision, 19J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1071, 1079-80 n.57 (1986).
The Court has not always applied a consistent level of scrutiny to abortion cases.
For a discussion of the inconsistency of United States Supreme Court opinions in
abortion decisions, see Note, Rational Basis? Strict Scrutiny? Intermediate Scrutiny ?Judicial
Review in the Abortion Cases, 9 OKLA. CiTY U.L. REV. 317, 319 (1984) [hereinafterJudi-
cial Review]. For further discussion of the inconsistency of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on abortion regulation, see infra note 68.
8. See infra note 69 for a discussion of the inconsistent nature of Supreme Court
decisions on the regulation of abortions for minors.
9. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987). The court did not write an opinion for its decision. Id.
10. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
11. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987). The Supreme Court voted four to four to uphold the
statute. Id. The petition for rehearing of the case was denied by the eight-member
Court. 108 S. Ct. 1064 (1988).
12. Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN (8th Cir. filed Aug. 27, 1987), vacated, 835
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notice prior to a minor's abortion.' 3 The Eighth Circuit's opinion
has since been vacated and a rehearing with the full appellate court
granted. 14
The Minnesota act is more burdensome to a minor seeking an
abortion than the Illinois act at issue in Zbaraz.15 The act is also
more burdensome than other existing parental notification stat-
utes. 16 The issues presented in Zbaraz and Hodgson require a defini-
tive ruling by the Supreme Court on parameters of parental
notification.
Hodgson and Zbaraz involve a unique blend of constitutional law
and minors' rights. A tracing of the history of abortion regulation
and the development of our juvenile court system reveals the con-
cerns that legislatures must balance in regulating minors' access to a
constitutional right.
F.2d 1545 (8th Cir.), and reh'g granted en banc, 835 F.2d 1546 (8th Cir. 1987) [herein-
after Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN].
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), is the only parental notification statute to
date to reach the Supreme Court after having been in effect. The trial court in Mathe-
son, however, did not issue any findings with respect to the operation of the statute.
Id. at 401-04. The trial judge held a trial at which the appellant, a pregnant minor,
was the only witness. Id. at 401. The trial judge then "adopted, verbatim, findings of
fact and conclusions of law prepared by appellant." Id. at 404 n. 10. Therefore,
Hodgson is important because it is the only parental notification statute so far to have
its operational effects carefully studied by a district court.
13. MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1986).
14. See Hodgson, 835 F.2d 1545 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (vacating opinion filed
Aug. 27, 1987); Hodgson, 835 F.2d 1546 (Dec. 31, 1987) (granting rehearing en banc).
15. See infra notes 212-47 and accompanying text.
16. At present, thirteen states have parental notification statutes, including Illi-
nois and Minnesota. The remaining states include Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah and West Virginia. See infra
note 251 for full citations. A few, including Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota and
Nevada, have been enjoined. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (statute enjoined until the Illinois Supreme Court
enacts rules assuring expedition and confidentiality in proceedings); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971, 994 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (statute enjoined
as unduly burdensome and further judicial proceedings stayed pending the outcome
of Zbaraz); Hodgson v. State, 648 F. Supp. 756, 780-81 (D. Minn. 1986) (statute en-
joined because 48 hour waiting period and two parent notification requirements
found to be excessively burdensome); Glick v. McKay, 616 F. Supp. 322, 325-27 (D.
Nev. 1985) (act enjoined until provisions mandating confidentiality and expedition of
judicial bypass proceedings are added); Women's Community Health Center v. Co-
hen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 545-48 (D. Maine 1979) (statute enjoined because it required
that parents always be informed of a minor's decision to seek an abortion which is
inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedent requiring an alternative to pa-
rental notification).
In contrast, Utah has recently upheld a parental notification statute. H.B. v. Wil-
kinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 953-55 (D. Utah 1986) (motion to enjoin statute dismissed
because minor was "immature" and the court stated that parental notification stat-
utes are constitutional as to immature minors).
1988]
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This Note will summarize several issues concerning the regulation
of abortion for minors. First, it will trace the history of abortion reg-
ulation in the United States. Second, a discussion of the develop-
ment of the juvenile court and the current rights of minors is
provided. Third, the major United States Supreme Court decisions
on abortion regulation with respect to minors will be outlined. Fi-
nally, the Note will summarize and compare the Illinois and Minne-
sota statutes with the other current notification/consent statutes.
The Note concludes that Minnesota should amend its act prior to
seeking reinstatement of the statute or appealing the decision to the
Supreme Court.
I. THE HISTORY OF ABORTION REGULATION
The movement to regulate abortions in the United States began in
the early nineteenth century.I 7 Prior to that time, abortion was a
widely used technique,18 performed by midwives,19 physicians,20
"herbal healers,"21 and by use of home remedies.22 Abortion was
advertised in newspapers. The government was indifferent to this
dissemination of abortion information.23 American courts followed
English common law, which did not condemn abortion before
"quickening," the point at which the mother could feel the fetus
17. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS: Roe v. Wade AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 11 (1987) [hereinafter RUBIN]. RUBIN is a very recent treatise on the legality
and politics involved in modern abortion legislation.
18. "[T]he practice of aborting unwanted pregnancies was, if not common, al-
most certainly not rare in the United States during the first decades of the nineteenth
century." MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 16 (1978) [hereinafter MOHR]. MOHR is often cited as the most
complete treatise on the history of abortion in early America.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id. at 14-16. Physicians did not always know whether a woman was pregnant.
In early pregnancy, it was difficult to be certain that she was pregnant, given the
medical technology at the time. Therefore, physicians often treated a woman for
"obstruction" or "menstrual blockage," pursuant to the knowledge that the woman
failed to menstruate. The cause of such a condition often could not be determined.
Id. at 14-15. Whether or not the physicians actually knew or intended to perform an
abortion is not known. Id. It is clear that at this time physicians could not be held
criminally liable for performing an abortion, even if the abortion was intended. Id. at
16.
21. Id. at 11-14. "Herbal healers" or folk doctors were informally trained indi-
viduals who treated ailments using potions derived from plants. Id.
22. Id. at 6-7. Many home medical manuals contained information on how to
induce an abortion. Id.
23. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 11-12. Change began in 1873 with the passage of the
Comstock law by Congress. MOHR, supra note 18, at 196. The law forbade any
drug, medicine or articles used for abortion or contraceptive purposes from being
circulated by mail or from being advertised. Id. The law is considered "a turning
point in anti-contraceptive legislation and ... the closest the federal government
ever came to .. .the anti-abortion crusade. Id. at 196-97.
[Vol. 14
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move, about sixteen to eighteen weeks into her pregnancy.2 4
The first abortion statutes were passed in the early 1800's25 and
were aimed at regulating the safety of abortion.2 6 In the mid-1800's,
the "quickening" doctrine was abandoned because of new knowl-
edge that a fetus develops gradually. 27 At the same time, some
members of the newly formed American Medical Association (AMA)
began to tire of competing with those not formally trained in
medicine. 28 These concerns, fueled by the fear that newly admitted
immigrants would outnumber "Americans"29 and the resentment to-
ward upper and middle class women for shirking their familial obli-
gations,3O combined to produce a strong anti-abortion movement.
The AMA was aided by the Roman Catholic church and many Protes-
tant clergy in the movement.3' Consequently, abortion was illegal
everywhere from 1880 to the 1970's.32
In the 1950's, American society began to undergo changes such as
population growth,a" concern for the environment and depletion of
world resources,3 4 the emergence of women in the work force,35 and
24. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 10-11. By 1860, seven out of nine state supreme
court decisions on abortion held that abortion before quickening was not a criminal
offense. C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT 219 (1985) [hereinafter SMITH-
ROSENBERG]. SMITH-ROSENBERG is a discussion of the American Medical Associa-
tion's involvement in the anti-abortion movement in the nineteenth century. As late
as 1879, Kentucky followed these early decisions, as did New York in 1872 and Wis-
consin in 1923. Id. at 219-20.
25. MOHR, supra note 18, at 20. Connecticut passed its statute in 1821, Missouri
in 1825, Illinois in 1827 and New York in 1828. Id. at 20-26.
26. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 13. The concern was prompted by the use of "unsafe
practices, poisonous remedies and criminally incompetent practitioners." Id.
27. Id. at 14.
28. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 229-31. Formally trained physicians,
known as "regulars," objected to midwives and to a newly-emerged group of physi-
cians known as "irregulars." Both of these groups advocated home treatment and
alternatives to the harsh drugs used by the "regulars." Id. at 229. SMITH-ROSENBERG
postulates that "regulars" may have been economically motivated. They were not as
free to perform abortions as the "irregulars," and therefore risked losing patients to
"irregulars" who would perform them. Id. at 232-33.
29. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 15.
30. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 236-37. The medical profession com-
plained that the women seeking abortions were mostly "affluent bourgeois ma-
tron[s]," not "deceived young women," toward whom they claimed to be
sympathetic. Id. at 236. The profession claimed that the matrons acted in discord to
a woman's traditional roles of "domesticity, nurturing, self-sacrifice, devotion to the
needs of others and especially the biological drive for impregnation." Id. at 237.
One commentator at the time remarked that women who sought abortions were
"self-indulgent." Id.
31. Id. at 218.
32. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 15-16.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 17.
19881
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the equal rights movement.3 6 Also at this time, physicians became
concerned with the unsafe and unsanitary conditions under which
many abortions were being performed.37 Further, many abortions
resulted in severe complications or death.38 These factors combined
to produce the abortion reform movement,39 which sought to reform
existing abortion legislation.40 The first abortion reform statutes
were passed in 1967.41 By 1970, twelve states had adopted some
type of reform legislation.42
In the late nineteenth century, many states passed laws prohibiting
the sale or use of contraceptives.43 Although the statutes were rarely
enforced by the 1960's, some remained on the books.44 Several
challenges to these statutes reached the United States Supreme
Court, but the constitutional issues were not decided due to techni-
calities.45 Finally, the issue of contraceptive use came to rest in
1965, with the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.46
In Griswold, the right to privacy was first recognized as a constitution-
ally protected right.47 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated
that the expressed rights in the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy
which, when read in conjunction with the ninth amendment, yield
several penumbral rights.48 The right of married couples to use con-
traceptives was found to be "within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."4 9 The right to sex-
ual privacy was extended to single persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.50
36. Id. Commentators have stated that equal rights are dependent upon the abil-
ity to control reproduction. Id.
37. Id. at 17-18.
38. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 223. "In one year alone, 1964, 10,000
women suffering from severe complications from criminal abortions were admitted
to New York City's public hospitals." Id.
39. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 15-16.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Id. at 22-23. Although the first statutory challenge had begun in California,
Colorado's statute actually passed first. After a struggle, California's statute was re-
luctantly signed by Governor Reagan. North Carolina was third in the same year. Id.
42. Id. The statutes were based on the Model State Abortion Law, drafted by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in the early 1960's. Id.
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id.
45. Id. Lack of standing or absence of a case or controversy prevented consider-
ation of the merits of the constitutional challenge. Id. at 210 n.17.
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
48. 381 U.S. at 484-86. "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
49. Id. at 485.
50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). "[I]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
[Vol. 14
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The significance of Griswold is that it established the constitutional
grounds for a challenge to abortion legislation.
By 1970, thirteen states had both civil and/or criminal challenges
to abortion statutes pending in their courts. 51 Decisions of the lower
courts varied markedly, 52 indicating the need for a Supreme Court
ruling. Many appeals and petitions for certiorari began to reach the
Supreme Court in the early seventies.53
Two cases, Roe v. Wade54 and Doe v. Bolton,55 were accepted for
hearing on May 31, 1971.56 The cases were argued in 1971 and rear-
gued in 1972.57 The opinions of both cases were announced in Jan-
uary, 1973.58 Roe was an appeal from a Texas district court,59 and
Doe from a Georgia district court.60 In the same year, the United
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." Id. at 453.
51. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 48. RUBIN contains a thorough discussion of the
cases brought at this time. See id. at 48-57.
52. Id. at 55. Some abortion statutes had been upheld and others struck down.
Courts had granted or denied injunctions of the various statutes. Id.
53. Id.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
56. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 55.
57. Doe, 410 U.S. 179; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
58. Doe, 410 U.S. 179; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
59. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. The Texas statute made abortion a crime, unless it was
done to save the mother's life. Id. at 117-18. Three parties challenged the statute,
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction. Id. at 120-21. Jane Roe, a pregnant
single woman, claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because it denied her
access to a safe abortion, performed by a competent doctor. Id. at 120. A physician
objected to the statute because it kept him from prescribing proper treatment for
many of his patients. Id. at 120-21. A married couple claimed that the wife's medical
condition would endanger her life if she became pregnant and was not allowed a
legal abortion under safe conditions. Id. at 121. The district court had issued declar-
atory relief to the physician and to Roe, but dismissed the married couple's com-
plaint. The injunction was denied for all parties. All three appealed the denial of the
injunction. Id. at 122.
60. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 184-87. The Texas statute had been passed before the
Civil War. Georgia's statute was an ALl version passed in 1968. RUBIN, supra note
17, at 57.
The Georgia statute at issue in Doe permitted some abortions beyond those nec-
essary to save the mother's life. For example, if the fetus were likely to be born with
birth defects or if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest abortions, were al-
lowed. Doe, 410 U.S. at 183. The statute also contained several provisions that made
an abortion very difficult to obtain. The woman was required to be a resident of
Georgia, the abortion had to be performed in an accredited hospital and approved by
an abortion committee and rape cases had to be certified. Id. at 184. Mary Doe, a
pregnant married woman, was informed that a pregnancy would endanger her life.
She applied for an abortion but her application was denied. She sought a declaratory
judgment that the statute was unconstitutional and an injunction against its contin-
ued enforcement. Id. at 185. The district court granted declaratory relief but denied
the injunction. Id. at 186-87.
1988]
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States Supreme Court was changing. Justices Harlan and Black left
the bench, and Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist were appointed
to the Court.61
The new Court decided that a logical extension of the given right
to privacy was a woman's right to an abortion.62 The Roe decision
indicated, however, that the abortion right was not absolute. The
decision was predicated upon a balancing of the rights of the state
and the rights of a woman. 63 State intervention in the rights of a
woman is not allowed in the first trimester of pregnancy, 64 but is
allowed in the second trimester if the regulation "reasonably relates
to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 6 5 States may
completely prohibit abortion in the third trimester, except to pre-
serve the mother's life or health.66
The prior abortion movements, both in favor of legalizing and in
favor of outlawing abortion, demonstrate that the conflict underlying
abortion regulation lies between one's moral perceptions (i.e., fetal
development, the role of women in society), and the need to monitor
a potentially unsafe procedure.
Legislative measures to regulate abortion have created obstacles
and burdens for women seeking abortions.67 The balance between
61. RUBIN, supra note 17, at 57.
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. ("[T]he right to privacy ... is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.") Id.
63. Id. at 155. The states' interests are the preservation and protection of mater-
nal health and safety and protecting potential human life. Id. at 154-56. The Court
stated that a compelling state interest must exist in order to intervene in the abortion
right. See id. at 162-64. Such a compelling state interest cannot exist in the first
trimester. See id. at 163.
After determining that abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy is less danger-
ous to the mother's health than is actual childbirth, the Court concluded that the
state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy. Id. at 163. Therefore, the abortion decision during the first trimes-
ter should be left to the woman and her physician. Id. at 164.
64. See supra note 63.
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. According to the Court, examples of state
regulation that would be permissible are the requirements concerning the qualifica-
tions and licensing of the person who would perform the abortion and those con-
cerning the licensing of the facility where the abortion may be performed. Id.
66. Id. at 163-64. The Court determined that when the third trimester begins,
the fetus has become viable. Id. at 160. After viability, a state may "proscribe abor-
tion ... except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 163-64.
67. For example, the statutes at issue in Doe made an abortion very difficult to
obtain. See supra note 60. Statutes creating obstacles to abortions have been enacted
since Doe. Provisions creating obstacles have included informed consent, spousal
consent, waiting periods, mandatory hospitalization, record-keeping and parental
consent or notification.
Statutes requiring the woman to receive information about abortion before giv-
ing her consent to the procedure have been both approved and disapproved by the
[Vol. 14
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the regulation and the burdening of abortion has been particularly
difficult for the United States Supreme Court in its decisions after
Roe v. Wade.68 The balance has been even more difficult for the court
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1986) (provision requiring presentation of seven
classes of information to the woman before she consents to an abortion is unconstitu-
tional); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976)
(written informed consent approved by the court).
A 24 hour waiting period before a woman could consent to the procedure, after
reading information on the procedure, was held to be unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983). A waiting period for adult women has not been challenged
since.
Statutes requiring mandatory hospitalization for abortions performed in the sec-
ond trimester have been rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983)
(requirement that all abortions after the first 12 weeks be done in a hospital found
too restrictive); Akron, 462 U.S. at 435-37 (second trimester hospitalization require-
ment deemed unnecessary). But see Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 512-15
(1983) (second trimester hospitalization requirement upheld because Virginia did
not require all abortions to be performed in full service hospitals and allowed them
to be done in licensed abortion clinics).
Statutes requiring record keeping or reporting of the abortion to local authori-
ties have been evaluated with different outcomes by the Court. See, e.g., Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 766-67 (record keeping and reporting requirement struck down because
found to be for identification purposes and not for health related interests); Danforth,
428 U.S. at 80 (reporting and record keeping requirement upheld because it was
reasonably related to health preservation and properly respected the patient's confi-
dentiality and privacy).
A spousal consent requirement was struck down in Danforth. 428 U.S. at 69
(Court found an "absolute and possibly arbitrary" veto of one spouse over another
to be offensive). This issue has not been challenged since Danforth. For a discussion
of the parental notification/consent provisions, see infra notes 99-140 and accompa-
nying text.
68. The United States Supreme Court opinions on abortion regulation after Roe
have not been consistent with each other. One problem has been the lack of applica-
tion of a consistent standard of review to the abortion decisions. For a discussion of
the varying standards of review that have been applied to post-Roe decisions, see
Judicial Review, supra note 7. Roe stated that a strict scrutiny standard was to be used
in making abortion decisions because of the privacy right involved. Roe, 410 U.S. at
155. But several post-Roe decisions did not use a strict scrutiny standard of review.
See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758-72 (1986) (it is not clear what standard was
used); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-51, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979) (a
standard higher than the rational basis was used, but unclear whether intermediate or
strict scrutiny used); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406-13 (1981) (something less
than strict scrutiny used).
Post-Roe decisions have also been inconsistent in their analysis. In Roe, 410 U.S.
at 163, the Court had stated that states may not regulate abortions during the first
trimester of pregnancy. But in some subsequent decisions, the Court has permitted
some state regulation in the first trimester. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 434 (some
regulation of abortion in the first trimester is permissible); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66
(states may not restrict access to abortion during the first trimester). Roe had also
stated that the regulation of abortion after the first trimester must reasonably relate
1988]
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to maintain when the abortion right as applied to minors is at is-
sue.69 This results from the unique place of minors in our society.70
II. THE RIGHTS OF MINORS
At common law, minors had only limited personal rights,71 and
were considered to be the property of their parents. 72 Minors could
not give consent to their own medical care because they were not
individuals with individual rights.7 3 Minors were also deemed to lack
"to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 410 U.S. at 163. Akron,
however, states that a regulation that reasonably relates to the state interest in pro-
tecting maternal health does not deviate from "accepted medical practices." 462 U.S.
at 434. Thus, Akron adds present knowledge of the medical profession to the stan-
dard of "accepted practice" in determining the reasonableness of the regulation. Id.
The Court's opinions on the abortion right with respect to minors have also been
inconsistent.
Several of the abortion decisions have been pluralities. All, with the exception of
Thornburgh, have been decisions on the right with respect to minors. Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 753. See infra note 69 for a discussion of the divided nature of the Court on
minors' abortion rights.
69. While opinions on the regulation of abortion with respect to adults have not
been unanimous, the opinions on the right with respect to minors have been deeply
divided. For example, in Matheson, 450 U.S. at 399, the Court upheld a parental
notification statute in a six to three decision, with five justices limiting the holding to
a narrow class of minors. In Belotti, 443 U.S. at 644-51, the Court was divided four to
four in its decision to strike a parental consent statute that failed to allow minors to
go to an independent decision-maker in lieu of their parents, to argue their maturity
or that parental consultation would not be in their best interests. In Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the justices failed to agree on the reasoning for
voiding a statute which prohibited distribution of contraceptives to minors.
In contrast, decisions on abortion regulations that affect adults have been more
definitive. Roe v. Wade was a seven to two decision. 410 U.S. 113 (WhiteJ. and Rehn-
quist,J., dissenting). In Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 481-82, the Court voted six to three that
a second trimester hospitalization requirement infringes upon a woman's right to an
abortion. But the same Court could not agree on a reason for upholding a parental
consent statute. Id. at 490-93. In an eight to one vote, the Court upheld a require-
ment that second trimester abortions be performed in licensed outpatient clinics.
Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 516-17. Nine justices agreed that a spousal consent require-
ment was unconstitutional in Danforth. 428 U.S. at 67-72. But only five justices
agreed that a parental consent provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 72-75. In con-
trast, all of the provisions of the Akron ordinance were held unconstitutional by the
Court in a six to three vote, including parental consent. The provisions included
mandatory hospitalization, informed consent, a 24 hour waiting period and parental
consent. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452.
70. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 446-66
(1890).
72. See Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 463 (1972).
Pilpel provides a discussion of a minor's right to consent to medical treatment and
regulations affecting that right.
73. See id. at 463. However, there are three exceptions to this rule. The first
exception is for emergency treatment of the minor. This has been construed nar-
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the experience necessary to give effective consent to their own medi-
cal treatment. 74 Despite the fact that minors are now viewed as peo-
ple with constitutional rights, 75 the "lack of capacity to consent"
theory still exists, because minors are still believed to possess a
unique "vulnerability" and lack of experience. 76 Since minors are
presumed to lack the capacity to consent to their own medical treat-
ment, the state gives the minors' parents the authority to consent to
treatment for their children.77
Since the United States Supreme Court decision In re Gault,78 mi-
nors have been viewed as individuals with constitutional rights79 in-
rowly to apply to medical procedures necessary to save life or limb. Id. at 464. The
second exception is for emancipated minors. An emancipated minor may consent to
medical treatment provided that the minor understands the nature and consequences
of the treatment in question. A minor may become emancipated by marriage, judicial
decree, parental consent, by becoming self-supporting or by failure of the minor's
parents to meet their legal responsibilities. Id. at 464-65. Third, mature minors may
give consent to medical treatment in some states. The mature minor must be able to
understand the nature and consequences of the treatment and the treatment itself
must benefit the minor. Id. at 466.
74. Id. at 464.
75. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion on the effect that
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) has had on the development and recognition of a mi-
nor's constitutional rights.
76. In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court states three reasons why minors' con-
stitutional rights are not equal to those of adults. First, they have a vulnerability to
harm. Second, they lack the experience and perspective needed to make informed
decisions. Third, parental guidance is important in the development of responsible
citizens. 443 U.S. at 634-39. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34
(1972) (Court recognized the importance of parental direction in the religious up-
bringing and the education of their children and the need to balance this interest
with the state's parens patriae power); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169
(1944) (Court upheld a state law which prohibited involvement of children in the sale
of religious literature on the street, stating that "streets afford dangers for them not
affecting adults").
77. See Note, Restrictions on the Abortion Rights of Minors: Bellotti v. Baird, 3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 122 (1980).
78. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13. Consequently, the Court's
decision in Gault extended to minors the due process rights of the privilege against
self-incrimination, id. at 55, notice, id. at 49, counsel, id. at 56, confrontation, id., and
cross-examination. Id.
79. See Pilpel, supra note 72, at 463. Since Gault, minors have been extended all
of the constitutional protections of adults, except for the right to a jury trial. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (right to privacy
extended to minors); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (prohibition against double
jeopardy applies to juveniles subject to juvenile court system) on remand to, Jones v.
Breed, 519 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt must be established in juvenile criminal cases); see also
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55, (juveniles are afforded protection from
coerced confessions) reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962). But see McKeiver v. Penn-
1988]
11
Staples: Parental Notification Prior to Abortion: Is Minnesota's Statute C
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
stead of the property of their parents.8 0 The Gault decision was
aimed at limiting the "unbridled discretion" that lower courts had
exercised81 because of the civil, rather than criminal, nature ofjuve-
nile proceedings.8 2 The effect of the Gault decision was that minors
were granted many of the procedural safeguards of adult criminal
trials during juvenile delinquency proceedings.83
Although minors are afforded many of the procedural protections
provided adults,84 the protective nature of the juvenile court system
itself is responsible for the different treatment of minors and adults
in the court system. The juvenile court system was established to
ensure the humane and protective judicial treatment of juveniles,
emphasizing the rehabilitation, rather than punishment, of juvenile
offenders.85 Thus, juvenile proceedings are considered to be civil
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (minors do not have the constitutional right to
jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
80. The Court stated that individual rights are predicated upon the affording of
procedural due process and that "[d]ue process is the primary and indispensible
foundation of individual freedom." Gault, 387 U.S. at 20.
81. Id. at 18. The Court stated that "U]uvenile court history has again demon-
strated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure." Id.
82. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Gault case.
84. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
85. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 30-31 (1927) [hereinafter
Lou]. Lou provides a good background discussion of the philosophical origins of the
juvenile court. Id. at 1-12.
The juvenile court is an outgrowth of the court of chancery or equity. Id. at 3.
Courts of chancery were the means by which the state excercised its parens patriae
power, or power as "father of the country," to care for minors and others who were
incapable of caring for themselves. Id. at 4. "The essential idea of chancery is wel-
fare or balancing of interests." Id. at 4. In the United States, the state has taken the
place of the monarch as the parens patriae of minors. Id. The court of chancery
orginally dealt with "neglected" or "dependent" children. The doctrine of parens
patriae was then extended to include delinquent children. Id. at 5.
The juvenile "reform movement" of the early nineteenth century was not en-
tirely an American phenomenon. Id. at 14. Attempts to give juveniles an alternate
method of trial had existed in other countries prior to reform in the United States.
Id. at 14-15. The reform movement in America sought initially to keep child
criminals in separate confinement from adults. Later, the movement modified court
procedure, such as separate hearings with separate record and docket and probation.
Id. at 15-16. The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899. Id. at 19.
The novel feature of this court was that a juvenile breaking the law was not treated as
a criminal but as a ward of the state, subject to the care, guardianship and control of
the juvenile court. Id. at 20.
Since it is thought that juveniles are more capable of rehabilitation than adults,
the aim of the juvenile court is rehabilitation of the criminal through "reformation,
protection and education rather than punishment." Id. at 7. As part of the rehabili-
tation effort, the state seeks to minimize stigmatizing juvenile offenders. Id.
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rather than criminal. 86
Juvenile courts typically focus on the minor's "best interests" in
making their decisions.87 The term seems to encompass all aspects
of the minor's life.88
Minnesota's Juvenile Court Act89 contains a requirement that
judges of lower courts state in writing the basis for their dispositional
decisions.90 The two-part evidentiary requirement limits the discre-
tion of trial court judges in determining what is in a minor's best
interests. The best interests standard is also important in a minor's
86. See, e.g., In reJ.E.C. v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 401, 225 N.W.2d 245, 253-54
(1975) (purpose of juvenile act is rehabilitation of juvenile, not punishment for
crime, so proceedings are "civil", not "criminal"); State ex rel. Miller v. Bryant, 94
Neb. 754, 144 N.W. 804 (1913) (juvenile law is not criminal in nature); In re Santil-
lanes, 47 N.M. 140, 151, 138 P.2d 503, 510 (1943) (delinquency proceedings are
civil, not criminal), Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio 475, 477, 196 N.E.2d 457, 458
(1964) (juvenile courts are civil, not criminal).
87. For example, the best interest standard is used in adoption, neglect and cus-
tody proceedings, and in dispositional orders. For a discussion of how the term is
used in each type of proceeding, see infra note 88.
88. In Oregon divorce proceedings, the court will not assume that either men or
women are more suitable for child-rearing in determining the best interests of the
child. Banta, The Welfare and Best Interest of the Child, 5 WILLIAMET-rE LJ. 82, 84-85
(1968). Refraining from constant litigation is also thought to be in a child's best
interests. Id. at 91.
In adoption proceedings, commentators have said that the identity of religion
between the child and the adoptive parent, the age of the prospective adoptive par-
ents, the child's choice of parents, the love and affection that the prospective parents
can offer, and "racial factors" are all to be balanced in determining which placement
would be in the child's best interests. Edwards, Adoption-The Welfare and Best Interests
of the Child, 5 WILLAME-rTE L.J. 93, 93-102 (1968).
One commentator has stated that in custody determinations the "best interests
standard generally includes the physical, mental, and moral well-being of the child."
Comment, Domestic Relations-Child Custody--Sufficiency of Record to Determining the Best
Interests of the Child, 52 IowA L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1967). This encompasses the "home
surroundings," the "character of individuals seeking custody," "school factors," the
"sanitary conditions of the home," and the "ability of individuals claiming ... cus-
tody to provide food, clothing, and education." Id. at 1018 n.6.
Dispositional decisions are made pursuant to a child's "social report which is the
result of an investigation of the child made by a court-appointed social worker." The
report discusses the "child's general social, emotional, and educational background."
Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Determining the Best Interests of the Child in Delin-
quency Proceedings, 61 GEO. LJ. 1401, 1415 (1973).
For a discussion of the "best interests" standard and its lack of defined standards
and direction, see Comment, The Custody Question and Child Neglect Rehearings, 35
U.CHI. L. REV. 478 (1968).
89. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.301 (1986 and Supp. 1987) are referred to as the
Juvenile Court Act.
90. Dispositional orders must discuss both the best interest of the child standard
and how the court's order serves that standard. In addition, a dispositional order
must discuss alternative dispositions that were considered and why they were not
appropriate. MINN. STAT. § 260.185, subd. 1 (1986).
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access to abortion. If a minor can convince a judge that parental
notification or consent would not be in her best interests, she can
obtain an abortion through waiver of consent or notice.91 Minne-
sota's parental notification statute requires a judge making such a
determination to state the basis for the decision.92
* Regulation of the abortion right for minors has been difficult for
the Supreme Court. 93 Concern for a minor's lack of capacity to con-
sent and other state interests94 must be balanced against the need to
protect her from judicial discretion while maintaining her best inter-
ests and constitutional rights.
Many commentators believe that minors should not undergo preg-
nancy to term, due to increased physical risks to the mother 95 and
91. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
92. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6(c)(iii) (1986). "A judge of the court who con-
ducts proceedings under this section shall make in writing specific factual findings
and legal conclusions supporting the decision .... " Id.
93. See supra note 69 and infra notes 100-38 and accompanying text.
94. States have justified parental notification statutes upon the following state
interests: discouraging adolescent sexual activity; ensuring that the minor make an
informed decision regarding abortion; protecting potential life; and promoting par-
ent-child intereaction. Comment, Parent versus Child: H.L. v. Matheson and the New
Abortion Litigation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 75, 98. The Comment discusses the problems in
the states' asserted interests in enacting parental notification statutes.
Commentators have indicated that notification statutes may be an "ineffective
.. . means to an end." Id. at 105. The fact that a minor has already engaged in
"premarital sexual activity may indicate a substantial degree of independence which
has already undercut the parents' interest in continued control over their daughter."
Id. The fact that the minor does not wish to tell her parents about the abortion
indicates already weakened parent-child relations. Id. Parental notification itself may
create a parent-child conflict. Id. at 106.
Social scientists have reported that increasing the consequences of teenage sex-
ual activity does not deter it. Zelnick, Sexual Activity, Contraceptive Use and Pregnancy
Among Metropolitan Area Teenagers: 1971-1979, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 230, 237 (1980);
Jaffe, Fertility Control Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
167, 168 (1976).
95. Studies show that teenagers are subject to greater health risks as a result of
pregnancy and childbirth than are adults. See, e.g., ALAN GUTrMACHER INsTrrTE,
ELEVEN MILLION TEENAGERS 22-23 (1976) [hereinafter ALAN GUTrMACHER]; Menken,
The Health and Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 45 (1972).
Parental notification requirements may even cause minors to attempt self-induced
abortions or seek illegal abortions. See Kahan, The Effect of Legalized Abortion on Morbid-
ity Resulting from Criminal Abortion, 121 Am. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 114, 120
(1975); Paul, Pregnancy, Teenagers and the Law, 6 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 142, 145 (1974).
Some teenagers denied an abortion may even commit suicide. Teicher, A Solution to
the Chronic Problem of Living: Adolescent Attempted Suicide, CURRENT ISSUES IN ADOLES-
CENT PSYCHIATRY 136, 137-38 (1973). Since women under age eighteen tend to seek
abortions at a later stage in pregnancy than adults, parental notification or consent
may further delay the entire process, increasing the danger of the abortion itself.
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 438 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the child.96 Some have said that teenage pregnancy may also result
in severe social consequences for the minor 9 7 and may instigate fa-
milial discord.98 Thus, legislation concerning a minor's abortion de-
cision should have as its primary purpose the protection of the minor
from potential family conflict, judicial discretion and the public.
The regulation of abortion began with Roe v. Wade and progressed
to cover issues that were not addressed in that decision. The follow-
ing section traces the Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the reg-
ulation of the abortion right with respect to minors.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ON ABORTION
After Roe, questions remained as to the extent that states could
burden the abortion right. States attempted to regulate abortions by
such methods as spousal consent, informed consent, hospitalization
requirements and parental notice or consent. 99 This section enu-
merates the various United States Supreme Court decisions on abor-
tion regulation, with concentration on those cases that address the
regulation of abortion with respect to minors.
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth 100 was the Court's
first opportunity to respond to a state statute that required unmar-
ried minors to obtain the consent of one parent, prior to the abor-
tion.l0I Adult women and their spouses were required to give
written consent prior to an abortion.102
All nine justices agreed that the spousal consent requirement was
96. Children born to minors are more likely to. suffer physical problems than
children born to adult women. Infants born to mothers under age sixteen are three
times more likely to die in the first year of life than children of a mother between the
ages of 20 and 24. PUjBL. HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, ED. AND WELFARE,
D.H.E.W. PUB. No. (HSA), TEENAGE PREGNANCY: EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM 2 (1979).
Children born to minors under age 15 are three times more likely to suffer nervous
system disorders than children born to mothers older than age fifteen. Id. Children
of teenage mothers are often neglected soon after birth. Id. at 3.
97. The younger a woman when she gives birth, the more likely her family will
live in poverty. ALAN GUTTMACHER, supra note 95, at 27. Teenage mothers are more
likely to drop out of school, id. at 25, to be unemployed and on welfare, id., to have
one and a half times more children than those who wait until twenty to twenty-four to
have their children. Id. at 29. Teen marriages are two to three times more likely to
end in divorce than adult marriages. Id. at 28.
98. Some parents abuse their daughter mentally and physically, when informed
of her pregnancy. Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychological Considerations, 21 CLINICS
IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1161-65 (1978). In addition to physical and mental
abuse, minors may face "withdrawal of financial support or obstruction of the abor-
tion decision." Matheson, 450 U.S. at 438 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. See supra note 67.
100. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
101. Id. at 58.
102. Id.
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unconstitutional.1os The Court stated that "the [s]tate cannot 'dele-
gate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and
totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of preg-
nancy.' "104 Only five justices agreed that the parental consent pro-
vision was unconstitutional.105 Thejustices reasoned that states may
not impose the absolute prerequisite of parental consent on a minor
seeking an abortion.10 6 As a result of Danforth, legislatures in several
states passed statutes providing for judicial consent as an alternative
to parental consent to a minor's abortion.1
0 7
Only one year later, in Carey v. Population Services International, the
Supreme Court extended its holding in Griswold v. Connecticut to mi-
nors.10 8 The Court relied on Danforth's prohibition against arbitary
vetoes. In a plurality opinion, the Court determined that minors
have the constitutional right to purchase non-prescriptive contracep-
tives, reasoning that states may not impose blanket parental consent
requirements for minors' abortions and that contraception is a less
drastic measure than an abortion.109
103. Id. at 69-71. "[Slince the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during
the first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State can-
not delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion
during that same period." Id. at 69. Since the woman bears the child and "is the
more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the
balance weighs in her favor." Id. at 71.
104. Id. at 69, citing Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
105. Id. at 74-75.
106. Id. at 74. The Court stated that minors as well as adults possess constitu-
tional rights. Id. It stated:
[T]he [s]tate may not impose a blanket provision ... requiring the con-
sent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an
unmarried minor during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy. Just as
with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the [s]tate does
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding
the consent.
Id.
107. Annotation,judicial Consent to Abortion by a Minor, 23 A.L.R. 4TH 1061, 1062
(1983).
108. 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). The Court stated that "[s]tate restrictions inhib-
iting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve 'any significant state interest
... that is not present in the case of an adult.' " Id. (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).
The statute at issue made it a crime "for any person to sell or distribute any contra-
ceptives of any kind to a minor under the age of 16 years. Id. at 681.
109. The Court stated:
Since the [s]tate may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blan-
ket requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate
her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed. The [s]tate's inter-
ests in protection of the mental and physical health of the pregnant minor,
and in protection of potential life are clearly more implicated by the abor-
tion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive.
[Vol. 14
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Three years after Danforth the issue of parental consent was again
before the Supreme Court. The Massachusetts' statute at issue in
Bellotti v. Baird 110 (Bellotti H) required unmarried minors to obtain
the consent of both parents (or guardian) prior to an abortion, un-
less one parent had "died or has deserted [the] family ... " I II If one
or both parents refused consent, an order could be obtained from a
superior court "for good cause shown."'112
The Court held in Bellotti II, a plurality opinion, that because pa-
rental consent is an undue burden on a minor, a state requiring a
minor to obtain parental consent before obtaining an abortion must
provide an independent, alternative procedure whereby authoriza-
tion can be obtained from a court.' 1 3 This procedure is often re-
ferred to as "judicial bypass."
The Bellotti H Court reasoned that, because the rights of minors
are not equal to those of adults,14 juveniles need the guidance of
their parents in making their abortion decision.It5 But the Court
also recognized the need for an alternative to direct parental con-
Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
The Court found that the statute did not further the state's interest in deterring
teenage intercourse. Id. at 695-96. One of the concurring justices stated that he
would encourage parental involvement in the minor's decision to use contraceptives.
Id. at 709 (Powell,J., concurring). Anotherjustice stated that a ban on contraceptives
is an inadequate means of deterring sex and would increase the incidence of preg-
nancy and venereal disease. Id. at 714-15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). In 1974, Massachusetts passed a
statute mandating parental consent prior to a minor's abortion. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, the statute was upheld. The statute afforded mature minors the op-
portunity ofjudicial waiver of consent and immature minors the opportunity to prove
that an abortion would be in their best interest. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 145
(1976) [hereinafter Bellotti I]. In 1975, Massachusetts enacted another section of the
act, adding exceptions for "emergencies" and "mature minors." The constitutional-
ity of this statute was also challenged and the case eventually reached the Supreme
Court. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti II].
111. Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 625; see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 12S (West Supp.
1979).
112. 443 U.S. at 625.
113. Id. at 647-48. "[E]very minor must have the opportunity ... to go directly
to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents." Id. at 647.
114. Id. at 634. "We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that
the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the pe-
culiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."
Id.
115. Id. at 641.
[Abortion] is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional
stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and sup-
port from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for
pregnant minors frequently take place.
Id. (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 (StewartJ., concurring)).
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frontation because of the nature of the abortion decision,' 16 the age
of the minor' 17 and most importantly, because of the policy against
absolute and arbitrary vetoes." 18
Thus, the Bellotti H Court decided that a minor must be afforded
the opportunity to obtain judicial, instead of parental, consent to an
abortion by demonstrating to a court that she is either mature
enough to make the decision herself or that the abortion would be in
her best interests.11 9 If one of those two criteria is not found, the
state may require parental consent.' 2 0 The judicial hearings on the
matter must be anonymous and expedient.121
Danforth and Bellotti H dealt with parental consent prior to a mi-
nor's abortion. The first and only Supreme Court case prior to
Zbaraz v. Hartigan addressing the constitutionality of parental notice
prior to a minor's abortion is H.L. v. Matheson.122 The statute at is-
116. See id. at 642. "[T]he unique nature and consequences of the abortion deci-
sion make it inappropriate 'to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's preg-
nancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.' " Id. at 643 (citing Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. at 74). In facing an abortion decision, "[t]he pregnant minor's options
are much different from those facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding
whether to marry." Id. at 642. "In sum, there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and
indelible." Id.
117. Id. "Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman,
... is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted mother-
hood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor." Id.
118. Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti II seemed most concerned with the Dan-
forth Court's reasoning, that minors have the opportunity to prevent an "absolute
and arbitrary" parental veto. Id. at 643-51. "In sum, the [parental notification proce-
dure] must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not in fact
amount to the absolute and possibly arbitrary veto that was found impermissible in
Danforth." Id. at 644.
119. Id. at 643-44. "A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: (I that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or
(2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abor-
tion would be in her best interests . . ." Id. Subsequent courts have defined the
minor's best interests regarding her abortion decision to include "her maturity, her
ability to make an informed decision, and her understanding of the abortion pro-
cess." Annotation, Requisites and Conditions of Judicial Consent to Minor's Abortion, 23
A.L.R. 4TH 1061, 1064 (1983).
120. See Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 648. "If... the court is not pursuaded by the minor
that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interests, it may decline
to sanction the operation." Id.
121. Id. at 645. "The Uudicial bypass] proceeding .. must assure that a resolu-
tion of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity
and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained." Id. at 644.
122. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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sue in Matheson required a physician providing an abortion for a mi-
nor to "[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman
upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the
husband of the woman, if she is married."123
The holding of the Court was narrow. It stated that the "mere
requirement of parental notice" does not impermissibly burden the
right of "immature dependent" minors.124 Thus, the Court did not
determine whether parental notification is constitutional as applied
to all minors, including those who are mature and whose best inter-
ests would not be served by such notice. The Court upheld the stat-
ute, reasoning that a parental notification statute, unlike a consent
statute, does not provide a third party absolute veto. 125
The standards of Bellotti II were reaffirmed in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health.126 The Ohio ordinance at issue in Akron
required all physicians providing abortions for minors under age fif-
teen to obtain the written consent of one of their parents twenty-four
hours before the abortion was to be performed.127 Consent could
also be obtained by judicial order of a Court with jurisdiction over
the minor.128 The statute also contained a provision requiring adult
women to wait twenty-four hours after signing the consent form.129
The Supreme Court found the parental consent provision to be
unconstitutional for failing to meet standards set forth in Bellotti II,
requiring the state to provide procedures for minors to obtain judi-
cial consent.o30 The Court also objected to the underlying assump-
123. Id. at 400. There was no consent provision.
124. Id. at 409. The Court stated that the statute enhanced parental consultation
concerning a decision that has potentially traumatic and permanent consequences"
and "serves a significant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to
supply essential medical information to a physician." Id. at 411-12.
125. Id. at 411.
126. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
127. Id. at 422. The statute also required physicians performing or inducing abor-
tions on minors under age 18 to give notice to one of the parents of the minor 24
hours before the abortion was to be performed. See id. This portion of the statute
was not appealed to the Supreme Court. See id. at 439 n.29. All abortions were to be
performed in a hospital after the first trimester. Id. at 422. Certain information was
required to be presented to the woman before she consented to the abortion. Id. at
423. Women were required to wait 24 hours after signing a consent form before the
abortion could be performed. Id. at 424. Fetal remains were required to be disposed
of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Id.
128. Id. at 422. Consent was required unless the woman had "obtained an order
from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or in-
duced." Id.
129. Id. at 424.
130. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-42. "The Court has held that 'the State may not
impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor.' " Id. at 439 (citing
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). The Court
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tion that all minors under the age of fifteen are too immature to
make the abortion decision or that the procedure may never be in a
minor's best interests.131
The "arbitrary and inflexible" waiting period was deemed uncon-
stitutional, because no legitimate state purpose was furthered by the
provision.132 The Court did not find any evidence that the abortion
would be performed more safely or that the woman's decision would
be more informed by the extra time.133
In a decision reached the same year as Akron, the Supreme Court
upheld a parental consent statute in Planned Parenthood Association v.
Ashcroft. 134 The Missouri statute in Ashcroft required anyone provid-
ing an abortion for a minor to obtain the written consent of one par-
ent (or guardian) if the minor was unemancipated.135 The statute
also provided the minor with an alternative to parental consent via a
judicial bypass provision, the requirements of which were explicitly
stated in the statute.i3 6 In a plurality decision, the statute was up-
held as consistent with standards set forth in Bellotti 11. 137
In sum,138 the four Supreme Court decisions addressing parental
consent yield the following rules. States may require the consent of
one parent prior to a minor's abortion if the state also provides for
added that the statute, without a provision whereby the minor could demonstrate her
maturity or that the abortion would be in her best interests, burdens the abortion
right of mature minors. See id. at 439-40 (citing Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 643-44).
131. Akron, 462 U.S. at 440. The Court stated that in accordance with prior
Supreme Court precedent, "it is clear that Akron may not make a blanket determina-
tion that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature to make this decision or
that an abortion never may be in the minor's best interests without parental ap-
proval." Id.
132. Id. at 450. "No legitimate state interest" is furthered by an "arbitrary and
inflexible waiting period." Id. The statute's second trimester hospitalization require-
ment was found to be a "heavy and unnecessary burden" on a woman's access to
abortion. Id. at 434-39. The Court found the informed consent provision to be un-
constitutional. Although the state may require a physician to make certain that the
woman understands the physical and emotional implications of having an abortion,
the state cannot adopt regulations which influence the woman's choice. Id. at 442-45.
133. Id. at 450.
134. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
135. Id. at 479 n.4; Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 1982).
136. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 479-80, n.4; Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 1(4), 2(3)-
(4) (Supp. 1982).
137. 462 U.S. at 490-93. The Court stated that parental consent provisions can be
upheld, as long as the state provides an alternative for the minor to demonstrate that
she is mature enough to make the decision herself or that, if immature, the abortion
would be in her best interests. Id. at 491 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40).
138. The above decisions are not the only cases the Supreme Court has decided
concerning abortion. In the same year as Akron and Ashcrofi, Simopoulos v. Virgina,
462 U.S. 506 (1983), was decided. In Simopoulos, the Court upheld a Virginia statute
requiring all second trimester abortions to be performed in licensed abortion clinics.
Id. at 519. The Court did not find the provision burdensome because it did not re-
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an expedient and confidential judicial hearing in lieu of parental con-
sent. The minor must be given the opportunity to persuade the
court either that she is sufficiently mature and able to make the deci-
sion herself, or that the abortion would be in her best interests. If
neither condition is found, the court may require parental consent.
Parental notice may be required before an immature or unemanci-
pated minor obtains an abortion. The constitutionality of requiring
parental notice prior to providing abortions for mature or emanci-
pated minors or minors whose best interests would not be served by
notification has yet to be determined.
If a full Supreme Court had ruled on Zbaraz, some of the open
issues regarding parental notification statutes may have been ad-
dressed. Some issues surrounding Minnesota's statute on parental
notification, however, would not have been answered by a ruling on
Zbaraz. This is because the statutes at issue in each case contain sub-
tle differences. Both of the statutes need to be decided by the
Supreme Court in order to set all of the parameters of parental
notification.
Without firmly articulated standards for notification statutes, states
have offered different versions of parental notification statutes.139
States seem to agree, however, on the need to protect juveniles from
judicial discretion, potential family discord, public scrutiny and bur-
quire second trimester abortions to be performed in full-service hospitals. Id. at 512-
15, 519.
More recently, the Court addressed another informed consent provision in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986). The statute at issue in Thornburgh contained several provisions regulating the
performance of abortions. An informed consent provision required seven classes of
information to be presented to the woman twenty-four hours before she consented to
the procedure. Id. at 760-61. A "record-keeping" provision required that certain
information about the woman and her physician be reported to the authorities. Id. at
765-66. Physicians performing abortions on a woman past her first trimester were
required to report the basis for a determination that the child was not viable. Id. A
"standard of care" provision required the physician to use the method most likely to
result in the birth of a live fetus unless there was a risk to the mother; a second
physician was to be present in post-viability abortions. Id. at 768-69. In a plurality
decision, the Court struck all of the provisions. The Court reasoned that the in-
formed consent provision was designed to discourage women from seeking abor-
tions, and the required information was deemed to be possibly non-relevant and
confusing. Id. at 760. The "record-keeping" requirements were struck because
records were made public and seemed to be more for identification purposes than for
"advancing any legitimate interest." Id. at 765. The "standard of care" provision
was struck because it did not contain an exception for medical emergencies. Id. at
770-71.
139. States are split on whether or not to contain waiting period requirements in
parental notification statutes. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text. States
also disagree on whether or not to require judicial bypass provisions. See infra notes
277-80 and accompanying text. Most statutes require notification of only one parent.
See imfra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
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dening the abortion right, while simultaneously seeking their goals
of "parental guidance" and "informed decisions" of the minor.140
As will be demonstrated, the Minnesota statute may not adequately
protect its minors while implementing its goals.
IV. HODGSON V. STATE-THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The Minnesota statute at issue in the Hodgson case requires the
person providing an abortion for a minor to notifyl4l both par-
ents' 42 of the minor at least forty-eight hours before performing the
abortion.143 Failure to do so subjects the abortion provider to civil
140. This can be demonstrated by the fact that many parental consent statutes
contain bypass provisions requiring the minor's anonymity to be preserved and that
judicial procedures be expedited. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
141. See generally MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1986). Subdivision 1, which discusses
guidelines for treatment of various medical problems of minors, is not at issue. Hodg-
son, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 3.
MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 2 reads as follows:
[N]o abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor
or upon a woman for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed
* . . because of a finding of incompetency, until at least 48 hours after writ-
ten notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the manner speci-
fied in subdivisions 2 to 4.
(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at the usual place of
abode of the parent and delivered personally to the parent by the physician
or an agent.
(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be made
by certified mail addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of the
parent with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee
which means postal employee can only deliver the mail to the authorized
addressee. Time of delivery shall be deemed to occur at 12 o'clock noon on
the next day on which regular mail delivery takes place, subsequent to
mailing.
Id. § 144.343, subd. 2 (1986).
The district court found that the waiting period could reach "a week or
more." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D.Minn. 1986). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found the waiting period could go up to 72
hours, due to mail delays. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-543 1-MN, slip op.
at 4.
142. See MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 3 (1986). Subdivision 3 defines "parent":
For purposes of this section, "parent" means both parents of the preg-
nant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if
only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably
diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has
one.
Id.
143. Id. § 144.343, subd. 2.
Subdivision 4, which provides when notice is not required, reads as follows:
No notice shall be required under this section if:
(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical
record that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and
there is insufficient time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons
who are entitled to notice; or
(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of sexual
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and criminal liability. 144 The statute also provides that if the notifi-
cation requirement is ever restrained or enjoined, which it has been
since 1981,145 the minor has two choices. The minor can either no-
tify both parents forty-eight hours before the abortion or demon-
strate to the court in a confidential and expedited hearing that she is
"mature and capable of giving informed consent" or that the abor-
tion would be in her best interests.146 The final statutory section
provides that any portion of the statute which is held invalid should
abuse, neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of
that declaration shall be made to the proper authorities as provided in sec-
tion 626.556, subdivision 3.
Id. § 144.343, subd. 4.
144. Id. § 144.343, subd. 5. Subdivision 5 is the "penalty" provision of the statute:
Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a misde-
meanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully de-
nied notification. A person shall not be liable under this section if the
person establishes by written evidence that the person relied upon evidence
sufficient to convince a careful and prudent person that the representations
of the pregnant woman regarding information necessary to comply with this
section are bona fide and true, or if the person has attempted with reason-
able diligence to deliver notice, but has been unable to do so.
Id. § 144.343, subd. 5.
145. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 228, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 1011. The statute was to
become effective August 1, 1981. It was challenged in a class action by minors, a
parent, four clinics and two physicians, seeking a declaratory judgment and an in-
junction. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 7. OnJuly 31, 1981,
the district court issued a temporary restraint of subdivision 2, the notice provision,
but not of subdivision 6, the judicial bypass procedure. On March 2, 1982, the court
issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of subdivision 2. Hodgson, Nos.
86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 7.
146. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6 (1986). Subdivision 6 reads as follows:
If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently re-
strained or enjoined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced as
though the following paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c) of that
subdivision; provided, however, that if such temporary or permanent re-
straining order or injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases
to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have full force and effect, without being
modified by the addition of the following substitute paragraph which shall
have no force or effect until or unless an injunction or restraining order is
again in effect.
(c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of
one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court
of competent jurisdiction shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an ap-
propriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if said
judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving
informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that
the pregnant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim
to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an
abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, or conser-
vator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to per-
form the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the
pregnant woman's best interests would be served thereby.
(ii) Such a pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in the
court on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
her. The court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court ap-
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not affect the portions of the statute which can be given effect with-
out the invalidated portion and is therefore severable from the rest
of the statute.147
Before the statute was to take effect on August 1, 1981, plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction.148 The plaintiffs
included several unemancipated minors, facilities which provide
abortion services and two physicians.149 The district court allowed
the judicial bypass provision to remain in force but temporarily re-
strained enforcement of the notice provision.150 On March 2, 1982,
the court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
parental notification provision.151 In January, 1985, the district
court rendered a partial summary judgmentl152 in favor of the
defendants. 153
pointed counsel, and shall, upon her request, provide her with such counsel.
(iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shall be confidential
and shall be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the
court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the
best interests of the pregnant woman. A judge of the court who conducts
proceedings under this section shall make in writing specific factual findings
and legal conclusions supporting the decision and shall order a record of
the evidence to be maintained including the judge's own findings and con-
clusions.
(iv) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any such
pregnant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abor-
tion without notification. An order authorizing an abortion without notifica-
tion shall not be subject to appeal. No filing fees shall be required of any
such pregnant woman at either the trial or the appellate level. Access to the
trial court for the purpose of such a petition or motion, and access to the
appellate courts for purposes of making an appeal from denial of the same,
shall be afforded such a pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Id.
147. Id. § 144.343, subd. 7. Subdivision 7 contains the severability portion of the
statute:
If any provision, word, phrase or clause of this section or the applica-
tion thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such inva-
lidity shall not affect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses or application of
this section which can be given effect without the invalid provision, word,
phrase, clause, or application, and to this end the provisions, words,
phrases, and clauses of this section are declared to be severable.
Id. § 144.343, subd. 7.
148. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 7.
149. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the statute violated due process on its face and as
applied. They claimed that it violated equal protection, first amendment rights of
custodial parents and various provisions of Minnesota's state constitution. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 773. The district court denied the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claim of a due process violation.
Id. at 770. It found that a dispute existed as to the issues of material fact, including
the confidentiality of the judicial bypass procedure, delays, inconvenience and lack of
access to courts in rural counties. Id.
153. Id. at 773.
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Plaintiffs argued that several portions of the statute were unconsti-
tutional. First, the notification provision was argued to be "facially
unconstitutional because it did not contain a judicial bypass provi-
sion."' 154 Second, plaintiffs alleged that the notification provision
"unduly burdened the fourteenth amendment due process rights of
pregnant minors," even when the judicial bypass is in effect, as it is
when the statute is enjoined.155 Third, plaintiffs claimed the stat-
ute's requirement that minors notify both parents, with exception
only when one parent is dead or if one parent cannot be located, is
unconstitutional.15 6 Fourth, the waiting period is unconstitutional
because it "impermissibly burdens a minor's right to choose
abortion." 157
The court found that issues of material fact existed as to the confi-
dentiality of the judicial bypass procedure, delays and inconvenience
and lack of access to the courts in rural counties.'5 8 The action pro-
ceeded to trial on these and other issues.1
59
In November, 1986, after a full trial, the district court enjoined
subdivision two of the statute because it did not contain a judicial
bypass procedure in effect at all times.' 60 The court reasoned that
the statute was not consistent with the Bellotti H standards requiring
the opportunity to go to a court as an alternative to seeking parental
notice or consent.1 61 The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to
subdivisions two through seven as a whole, based on findings that
the procedures have been confidential and expedited, in accordance
with Bellotti 1. 162 The district court enjoined enforcement of the two
154. Id. at 770.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Plaintiffs claimed that subdivisions two through seven of the statute were un-
constitutional because, as a whole, they burdened the rights of minors. They argued
that the statute was not narrowly drawn and did not meet the state's interests. Id. at
773. Defendants wanted the court only to determine whether the statute complied
with the Bellotti H guidelines. Id.
The district court, agreeing with the defendants on the appropriate scope of re-
view, cited Bellotti II's requirement that a minor be afforded judicial bypass as an
alternative to parental notification. Id. The court therefore held that the statute was
unconstitutional, since it provided judicial bypass only if enforcement was enjoined.
Id.
161. Id. at 773.
162. Id. at 777. The district court determined compliance of the statute with Bel-
lothi H's requirements of confidentiality and expedition based on its study of the ac-
tual operation of the statute between 1981-86. Id. at 776-77. The court concluded
that judicial procedures have been expedited based on its findings that courts in Hen-
nepin, Ramsey and St. Louis counties have adopted procedures for hearing petitions
"outside of normal business hours and on an emergency basis." Id. at 762. Although
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parent notification provision,163 concluding that the requirement
"places a significant burden upon pregnant minors who do not live
with both parents"' 64 and that the requirement did not further any
state interest.165 The court then enjoined enforcement of the "un-
reasonable" forty-eight hour waiting period.166 The court cited the
Seventh Circuit's invalidation of the twenty-four hour waiting period
in Zbaraz, and its own findings that current conditions in Minnesota
make the provision burdensome.167
the court found that scheduling delays may greatly increase the burden, it concluded
that the delay did "not reflect a systematic failure to provide a judicial bypass option
in the most expeditious practicable manner." Id. However, it also found that since
minors have had to wait two to three days between their first contact with the court
and the actual hearing, -[t]his delay may combine with other scheduling factors to
result in a delay of a week or more." Id. at 763.
The district court also found:
[t]hose involved in the proceedings take steps to insure confidentiality, in-
cluding destroying interview notes, holding hearings in judges' chambers
rather than in open court, and referring to petitioners by first name only...
The record discloses that the confidentiality of minors electing the judicial
bypass option has been breached only in a small number of isolated cases.
Id. at 763.
163. Id. at 778.
164. Id. at 777. The court based this conclusion on its findings that "[n]o excep-
tion is made for parents likely to react with psychological, sexual or physical violence
toward either the minor or the custodial parent." Id. at 764. Further, "[niotification
of an abusive or even a disinterested absent parent may reintroduce that parent's
disruptive or unhelpful participation into the family at a time of acute stress." Id.
The court reasoned that notification of the second parent or a court appearance,
even when the two parents live together, may interfere with parent-child communica-
tion and discourage the state's interest in promoting family communication. Id. at
778.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 780.
167. Id. at 779. The district court found that most of the state's abortion provid-
ers are in the Twin Cities or Duluth. Women outside of these areas must travel,
adding to the delay and expense of the abortion. Id. at 761.
The court also found that there are usually two or three days between a minor's
first contact with the court and the actual hearing. This delay can combine with
"scheduling difficulties" to produce a longer delay. The court concluded that
although the delay is burdensome to minors, they are "unavoidable and do not re-
flect a systemic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditous
practicable manner." Id. at 762.
Further findings of the court indicate that some counties do not have a judge
who "is willing to hear bypass petitions." Id. at 763. Therefore, "[a] minor in one of
these counties must travel to another . . . to obtain an expeditious hearing of her
petition." Id. The court concluded that, although this is burdensome to the minor, it
"also does not reflect a systemic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the
most expeditious practicable manner." Id.
The district court stated in its findings that, when necessitated by pressing
needs, courts in Hennepin, Ramsey and St. Louis counties will hear more petitions
than are scheduled in a single day. Id. at 762. In addition, "[t]hese courts also have
in place procedures for hearing bypass petitions outside of normal business hours on
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The court found that the forty-eight hour waiting period, but not
the two-parent notification provision, was severable from the rest of
the statute.168 The district court reasoned that the words "at least
forty-eight hours after" could be deleted from the statute without
defeating the intent of the legislature.' 69 The court held that the
language of the two-parent notification provision, however, was "in-
separably intertwined" within subdivisions two through seven of the
statute because the rest of the statute could not be given effect with-
out defining the word "parent." 70
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.' 7 ' Plaintiffs sought to keep the injunction against
enforcement of subdivision two. 17 2 They argued that subdivision
two "is unconstitutional on its face, because it fails to afford mature
minors and minors whose best interests are contrary to parental in-
volvement, with an opportunity to obtain a judicial or administrative
waiver of the notification requirement."173 Defendants maintained
"that no Supreme Court majority opinion has ever squarely ex-
tended the blanket consent proscription to a blanket notice require-
ment."' 74 They claimed "a notice requirement is less burdensome
than a consent requirement, and is therefore a constitutional means
of furthering the State's significant interest in encouraging parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision."75
Recognizing that the state has a broader authority to regulate the
activities of minors than those of adults, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked for a "significant" state interest. 176 The state argued
that the statutory purposes were to "foster intra-family communica-
tion and to protect pregnant minors, by promoting parental involve-
ment in the minor daughter's abortion decision."1 77 Plaintiffs
claimed that "the statute unduly burdens the minor's exercise of her
right to seek an abortion," particularly where both parents do not
an emergency basis." Id. Without any express time limitation set forth in the statute,
it seems to be in a court's discretion to decide when to hear the petitions.
168. Id. at 780.
169. Id.
170. Id. "The Minnesota legislature would not have enacted a statute requiring
notification of a minor's parents prior to the abortion without identifying the individ-
uals entitled to such notice." Id.
171. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 8.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted). The statutes in Asheroft, Akron, Danforth and
Bellotti II were consent statutes. The Matheson court ruled on a notification statute, but
the majority never decided whether it would be constitutional to apply a notice re-
quirement to mature, emancipated or "non-best interest" minors. Id. at 12 n.3.
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 8.
177. Id. at 6.
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live at home.i78
The court of appeals found the statute to be unconstitutional for
several reasons. First, it did not have a judicial bypass procedure
which would enable the minor to demonstrate in court either that
she is sufficiently mature to decide for herself or that the perform-
ance of an abortion would be in her best interests, without parental
notification. 179 Second, it was unconstitutional to require a pregnant
minor to notify both of her parents.' 8 0 Third, the requirement of
notifying both parents when possible was not severable from the
statute.' 8 ' Finally, the court of appeals upheld the district court's
injunction of sections two through seven of the statute.'
8 2
V. ZBARAZ V. HARTIGAN-THE FACTS OF THE CASE
At issue in Zbaraz is the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of
1983.183 The act requires anyone providing an abortion for a minor
to give notice to both parents at least twenty-four hours before the
abortion is performed.18 4 The minor may procure waiver of such
178. Id. at 14.
179. Id. at 13. The court found that, although the state has a significant interest in
promoting family communication, the notice requirement failed to promote the
state's asserted interest. Id. at 8. The court based its decision on the following find-
ings of the district court: 1) Fifty percent of all marriages in Minnesota end in divorce
and forty-two percent of all minors in Minnesota do not live with both biological
parents. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768. 2) Many children in dysfunctional families
"live in fear of violence by family members" and parental notification exacerbates
family violence. Id. at 768-69. 3) Minors who would notify one parent might be dis-
suaded from doing so because of the two parent notification requirement. Id. The
district court concluded that the notification requirement actually discourages, rather
than encourages, parent-child communication. Id. at 778.
180. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 2-3. The court reasoned
that the minor herself or her parents are in a better position than the court to decide
whether notification of the non-custodial parent would be in the best interests of the
minor. Id. at 22. It does not make sense to require the minor to go first to the court
for determination of her maturity or best interests. Id.
Bellotti II upheld a requirement that a pregnant minor obtain both parents' con-
sent but did not address the constitutionality of such a provision where both parents
were not residing together. Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 649.
181. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 25-26. The court of ap-
peals found that the statute would leave ambiguous which parent would have a cause
of action if denied notification. Id. at 24. It further found that the legislature in-
tended that both parents be notified, even when divorced. Id. at 24-25. The court
explained that although Bellotti II allows for a provision requiring notification of both
parents where they are residing together and the minor is at home, the notification of
both parents in any situation other than the above would be too drastic to remain
constitutional. Id. at 25.
182. Id. at 3.
183. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64-68 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
184. (a) No person shall perform an abortion upon an unemancipated mi-
nor or upon an incompetent unless he or his agent has given at least twenty-
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notice185 if the court finds that the minor is "mature and well-in-
formed enough to make the abortion decision on her own" or that
parental notice would not be in the minor's best interests.186 Failure
to comply with the act is a misdemeanor and may result in the impo-
sition of civil penalties.187
four hours actual notice to both parents or to the legal guardian of the mi-
nor pregnant woman or incompetent of his intention to perform the abor-
tion or unless he or his agent has received a written statement or oral
communication by another physician, hereinafter called the "referring phy-
sician," certifying that the referring physician or his agent has given such
notice.
(b) If the minor's or incompetent's parents are divorced, or one par-
ent is not available to the person performing the abortion or his agent or the
referring physician or his agent in a reasonable time or manner, then notice
to the parent with custody or to the parent who is available shall be suffi-
cient. If neither parent nor the legal guardian is available to the person
performing the abortion or his agent or the referring physician or his agent
within a reasonable time or manner, notice to any adult person standing in
loco parentis shall be sufficient.
Id. para. 81-64(a), (b).
185. Section 4(c) provides:
A minor or incompetent who objects to notice being given her parents
or legal guardian under this section may petition, on her own behalf or by
next friend, the circuit court of the county in which the minor resides or in
which the abortion is to be performed for a waiver of the notice requirement
of this section pursuant to the procedures of Section 5 of this Act.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64(c) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (footnote omitted).
The applicable portions of paragraph 81-65 are as follows:
(c) Court proceedings under this Section shall be confidential and
shall ensure the anonymity of the minor or incompetent. These proceed-
ings shall be given such precedence over other pending matters as is neces-
sary to ensure that the court may reach a decision promptly, but in no case
shall the court fail to rule within 48 hours of the time of application, pro-
vided that the 48 hour limitation may be extended at the request of the
minor or incompetent.
(e) A court that conducts proceedings under this Section shall issue
written and specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its de-
cision and shall order that a confidential record of the evidence be main-
tained.
(0 An expedited confidential appeal shall be available, as the Supreme
Court provides by rule, to any minor or incompetent to whom the circuit
court denies a waiver of notice.
(g) The Supreme Court is respectfully requested to promulgate any
rules and regulations necessary to ensure that proceedings under this Act
are handled in an expeditious and confidential manner.
Id. para. 81-65 (c), (e), (f), (g).
186. (d) Notice shall be waived if the court finds either:
(i) That the minor or incompetent is mature and well-informed
enough to make the abortion decision on her own, or
(ii) That notification of those to whom Section 4 of this Act re-
quires that notice be given would not be in the best interests of the
minor or incompetent.
Id. para. 81-65(d) (footnote omitted).
187. The "penalty" provision reads as follows:
Any person who intentionally performs an abortion with knowledge
that, or with reckless disregard as to whether the person upon whom the
abortion is to be performed is an unemancipated minor or an incompetent,
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The act was temporarily restrained in January, 1984 by the district
court, pursuant to plaintiff's suit.188 In May, 1984, the district court
declared the act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined it.189
Plaintiffs claimed that the statute's twenty-four hour waiting period
was unconstitutional because, while the Supreme Court has not
ruled on a waiting period regarding minors, they had struck down
waiting periods for adult women.190 Plaintiffs objected to the stat-
ute's judicial bypass provision because of its failure to provide an
expedited appeal or anonymous court proceedings.19 1 Defendants
argued that the district court should abstain from deciding the con-
stitutional issues because Illinois courts had not yet had an opportu-
nity to rule on the procedural aspects of the statute. 9 2 The district
court based its injunction on several findings. First, the twenty-four
hour waiting period after parental notification unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to an abortion.19 3 Second, the judicial by-
pass procedure fails to require the procedures to be conducted expe-
and who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to conform to any re-
quirement of this Act, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
Failure to provide persons with information pursuant to the require-
ments of this Act is prima facie evidence of failure to obtain informed con-
sent and of interference with family relations in appropriate civil actions.
The law if this State shall not be construed to preclude the award of exem-
plary damages in any appropriate civil action relevant to violations of this
Act. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the common law rights
of parents.
Such prima facie evidence shall not apply to any issue other than failure
to inform the parents or guardian and interference with family relations in
appropriate civil actions.
Id. para. 81-68.
188. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Plaintiffs con-
sisted of all licensed physicians performing abortions for unemancipated minors and
disabled persons, plus all unemancipated minors capable of giving informed consent
to an abortion or whose best interests would not be served by notice to both parents.
Id. at 1454 n.l. Defendants consist of all of the County Attorneys of Illinois. Id. at
1454 n.2.
189. Id. at 1467.
190. Id. at 1458. The district court cited the fact that the Supreme Court struck
down the waiting period in Akron. Id. The district court also cited the fact that the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the waiting period in Ashcroft, 763 F.2d
at 1536. The court then cited the Seventh Circuit case of Indiana Planned
Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983), in which a parental notifica-
tion statute containing a 24 hour waiting period was struck down. Id. at 1458. The
Pearson court had held the waiting period unconstitutional. 716 F.2d at 1143-44.
191. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1461. Objection was also made to the failure to pro-
vide assistance in initiating a petition. Id. at 1462. The statute also required a physi-
cian to notify an incompetent patient's guardian. Plaintiffs claimed that this provsion
would burden those individuals who had guardians appointed but who are able to
make their own decisions regarding abortion. Id.
192. Id. at 1457.
193. Id. at 1458-59.
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ditiously and confidentially, and is therefore unconstitutional.194
Third, since the unconstitutional provisions of the act were not sev-
erable from the rest of the act,' 95 the entire act was unconstitutional
and must be enjoined.196
In June, 1984, after the district court's decision, the act was
amended to provide that the judicial bypass procedures "shall en-
sure ... anonymity,"1 9 7 and a severability clause was added.198 The
amendments were immediately enjoined.99 The defendants then
appealed the district court's holding to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.200
The court of appeals, in ruling on the amended statute, upheld the
district court's finding that the twenty-four hour waiting period was
unconstitutional.20, The Supreme Court held in Belloti H that the
judicial bypass provision must be "completed with anonymity" and
194. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1459-62. The court discussed the requirements of
Bellotti II and Ashcroft of expeditious and anonymous proceedings in procuring the
judicial bypass alternative to parental notice of a minor's abortion decision. Id. at
1459 (citing Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 644).
For example, the Missouri statute in Ashcroft assured anonymity by allowing a
minor to use her initials on the court petition. The statute also provided a framework
for the means of expediting judicial proceedings by requiring that the appeal be per-
fected within five days from the filing of notice to appeal. Id. (citing Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
at 493-94). See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
195. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1464. The district court reasoned that since two basic
provisions of the statute were unconstitutional (the waiting period and the judicial
bypass procedure), the portions of the statute that would remain would not have
operative significance standing by themselves. Id.
The act's severability was based on a general statutory provision which, in sub-
stance, provided that if "any provision of an Act . . . is held invalid, such invalidity
does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect
without the invalid application or provision, and to this end the provisions of each
Act enacted . . . are severable .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, para. 1032 (1986).
196. Zbaraz, 584 F. Supp. at 1467. In addition, the district court struck down the
plaintiffs' challenges that: 1) the judicial bypass procedures are unconstitutional be-
cause they fail to provide for assistance in initiating a petition, thus limiting the ability
of some minors to go to the court to initiate bypass; 2) the requirement that a physi-
cian notify an incompetent patient's guardian is overbroad. Id. at 1462-64. These
were not issues addressed by the court of appeals and will not be discussed further.
197. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65(c)(Smith-Hurd 1986).
198. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-68.1 (Smith-Hurd 1986). The new severabil-
ity provision reads as follows:
If any provision, word, phrase or clause of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses or application of this
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision, word, phrase,
clause, or application, and to this end the provisions, words, phrases, and
clauses of this Act are declared to be severable.
Id.
199. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1535 (7th Cir. 1985).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1537-38. The court of appeals acknowledged the state's significant in-
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expedition.202 The court of appeals vacated the district court's opin-
ion holding that the bypass procedure was unconstitutional due to its
lack of rules assuring an expeditious and confidential hearing. The
entire act was enjoined until the Illinois Supreme Court could enact
rules to assure an expeditious and confidential hearing. 2 03
In determining that the waiting period was unconstitutional, the
court cited numerous cases holding that waiting periods are burden-
some to a woman seeking an abortion,204 and reasoned that the bur-
den of a waiting period is the same for minors and adults.205 The
court of appeals, however, held that the waiting period, because of
its unconstitutionality, could be severed from the rest of the act, leav-
ing the requirement of mere parental notice. 206
The Illinois Attorney General appealed the case to the United
States Supreme Court in October, 1985.207 Two issues were consid-
terest in promoting parental consultation, but reasoned that this was outweighed by
the burden it placed on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. Id. at 1538.
202. The bypass procedure "must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition
to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id. at 1539,
quoting Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 644.
203. Id. at 1545. In addition, the court compared the statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in Ashcroft. The Ashcroft statute contained a time limitation from the
date of issuance of the order, to the notice of intent to appeal and a five-day limit to
perfect the appeal from the time of filing of notice, to appeal. Id. at 1540, citing Mo.
REV. STAT. § 188.028.2(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Illinois statute does not con-
tain any similar regulations. Instead, it instructs the Illinois Supreme Court to pro-
mulgate rules requiring a confidential and expedited appeal. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 81-65(g) (Smith-Hurd 1987). In Illinois, rules governing appellate procedure
must be enacted by the Illinois Supreme Court. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
Since the judicial bypass provision was in operation without rules, the court of
appeals deferred judgment on its constitutionality and enjoined its enforcement until
some rules could be promulgated. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1545.
The Ashcroft statute also allows the minor to use her initials on the petition of
waiver of consent. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.16. In contrast, the Illinois statute does
not contain any specific provisions to assure anonymity. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1543.
204. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1536-37 (citing Bellotti I1, 443 U.S. at 642).
205. Id. at 1537. The court also discussed the fact that scheduling and travel de-
lays may increase the waiting period and the medical risks by pushing pregnancy into
another trimester in addition to increasing mental anguish. Id.
206. Id. at 1545. The court concluded that the provisions of the act pertaining to
the 24 hour waiting period could be severed from the act because the essential pur-
poses of the act would not be affected by the severance. ld. The opinion stated that
unconstitutional statutory provisions may "be severed if it appears that the legisla-
ture would have enacted the constitutional provisions of the statute independently of
those provisions." Id. (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)). A statutory
provision cannot be severed if it is " 'an integral part of the statutory enactment
viewed in its entirety.' " Id. at 1545 (quoting Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481
(5th Cir. 1981)).
207. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 55 U.S.L.W. 3039 (1986).
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ered. First, the Court considered whether Illinois may "constitution-
ally impose [a] waiting period, applicable only to minors and
incompetents, after parental notification but before [the] abortion is
performed, where it also provides judicial alternative to notifica-
tion." Second, the Court evaluated whether a "judicial alternative to
parental notification of [the Illinois act] provide[s] [a] constitution-
ally sufficient framework for ensuring confidential and expedited
appeals."208
The case reached the Supreme Court, but the Court was split four
to four in its decision.209 Thus, the decision of the Seventh Circuit is
controlling. The Court did not issue an opinion for its ruling.210
VI. COMPARISON OF THE ILLINOIS AND MINNESOTA STATUTES
Although the Illinois and Minnesota statutes are similar, their sub-
tle differences affected the factors that each circuit court chose to
emphasize in its analysis. Both statutes contain a notification provi-
sion, a waiting period, a judicial bypass provision, and a severability
provision. The statutes differ in the given waiting period, in the con-
tent of their judicial bypass provisions, and in the content of their
notification provisions.
A. The Waiting Period
Minnesota's statute requires a forty-eight hour waiting period,
whereas Illinois requires a twenty-four hour period.21 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found the twenty-four hour waiting period
in Zbaraz to be unconstitutionally burdensome to a minor.212 In con-
trast, the Hodgson court did not rule on the constitutionality of its
statutory waiting period alone.21 3 Instead, the court considered the
provision to be one factor2l4 in its analysis of the notice requirement
as a whole.215 It concluded that the entire section was unconstitu-
208. 56 U.S.L.W. 3070 (1986). The case was postponed in October, 1986 for fur-
ther consideration of the question of jurisdiction. 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986). In March,
1987, oral argument was deferred to a later date. Zbaraz, 107 S. Ct. 1600 (1987).
The parties were directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the merits of the
jurisdictional statement and the question whether the court of appeals' decision is
sufficiently final to permit the Court to take jurisdiction of the case. 107 S. Ct. 1636
(1987).
209. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
210. Id.
211. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987); MINN. STAT.
§ 144.343, subd. 2 (1986).
212. See Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538.
213. See Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN.
214. See id. at 12.
215. Id. at 8-20.
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tional on its face, 2 16 but based its decision largely on its objection to
the two parent notification requirement.
2 17
B. The Judicial Bypass Procedure
Minnesota's judicial bypass procedure only goes into effect if the
act is enjoined or restrained.218 The court of appeals held the act
unconstitutional for failure to provide a judicial alternative to notice
at all times.219 The court found that the mere presence of the re-
quired bypass procedure did not save the notification require-
ment. 22 0 In contrast, Illinois' "procedure for waiver of notice"221 is
effective even when the act has not been enjoined or restrained.222
The Seventh Circuit objected to this provision because it failed to
provide the means by which the minor will be assured of a confiden-
tial and expedited petition or appeal. 22 3 The section contains lan-
guage mandating anonymity and promptness, but it does not
explicitly state the means by which those ends should be accom-
plished, and directs the Illinois Supreme Court to compile such
rules.224
Minnesota's act also contains similar language mandating speed
and anonymity, and like Illinois' statute, it does not address the
means by which they can be assured.2 25 Minnesota's act does not
contain provisions directing the state supreme court or any legisla-
tive body to promulgate such rules. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals did not discuss the absence of such provisions in its opinion.
2 2 6
The district court did not discuss the absence either.22
7
216, Id. at 19-20.
217. Id. at 14-20.
218. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6 (1986).
219. Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 13. The court of appeals rea-
soned that operating the statute without judicial bypass would make the statute into a
"blanket" notice requirement. Since the Supreme Court objected to a blanket consent
requirement in Bellotti H, the Eighth Circuit objected to a blanket notice requirement.
Id. at 12-13. It then stated that "both parental consent and notice requirements are
burdensome to a pregnant minor." Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 20. The court stated that there were two reasons that the bypass provi-
sions were unconstitutional. Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 21-22. First,
the bypass provision itself constitutes a burden or obstacle. Id. at 21. Second, where
parents are divorced, the minor and/or the remaining parent are in the best position
to decide whether or not to notify the non-custodial parent. Id. at 22.
221. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
222. Id. para. 81-64(c).
223. "Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1539-44. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65
(Smith-Hurd 1987).
224. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65(f)-(g).
225. See MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6(c)(iii) and (iv) (1986).
226. See Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN.
227. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 773-77 (D. Minn. 1986).
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The Hodgson court objected to Minnesota's provison that a minor
always notify both of her parents of her pending abortion. 228 The
Zbaraz court did not object to this provision of the Illinois statute. 229
The discrepancy is probably due to the difference in the way the two
statutes are drafted. Minnesota defines "parent" as "both parents of
the pregnant woman if they are both living."230 Notice of only one
parent is required only if one parent is living, if one parent cannot be
located, or if the minor has a legal guardian. 231 The act does not
contain a provision for divorced parents. The Illinois act requires
notice to "both parents or to the legal guardian."23 2 In contrast to
Minnesota, however, notice to only one parent is allowed if the mi-
nor's parents are divorced, or if "one parent is not available."233
C. Severability
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits reached different conclusions re-
garding the severability of the unconstitutional portions of their stat-
utes. The Hodgson court concluded that the two parent notification
provision was not severable from the rest of the statute. 23 4 The
Zbaraz court did sever the twenty-four hour waiting period, the por-
tion of the statute that it found to be the most offensive, from the
rest of the statute.23 5
Both courts agree that severance of an invalid portion of a statute
is proper if the remaining portion of the statute remains opera-
tive,23
6 but that it is improper if the offending portion is "an integral
part of the statutory enactment viewed in its entirety." 23 7 The courts
also looked to the intent of their legislatures and to whether the inva-
lid sections of the statutes would have been enacted independently
of the remainder of the act. 23 8
228. This was the Eighth Circuit's primary objection to the statute. See Hodgson,
Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 14-20. The court objected to the burden
imposed by notification of the non-custodial parent. See id.
229. See generally Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1534-45.
230. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 3 (1986).
231. Id.
232. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
233. Id. at para. 81-64(b).
234. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 23-25.
235. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1545. The bulk of the court's decision is devoted to the
discussion of the burdensome nature of the waiting period. Id. at 1535-39.
236. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 23 (the court quotes
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) noting that "the invalid part [of the statute]
may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law"); Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1545
(the Illinois statute provides for severence when there are "provisions which can be
given effect without the invalidating provisions").
237. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 23; Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at
1545 (quoting Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)).
238. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-543 1-MN, slip op. at 23; Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at
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The Eighth Circuit concluded that the two-parent notification re-
quirement was not severable from the statute for three reasons.
First, the statute would be left ambiguous without the provison.239
Second, the Minnesota legislature had intended to require notifica-
tion of both parents. 240 Third, the court felt that the rewriting of the
statute should be done by the legislature, not the courts, in order to
maintain legislative intent.241
The Seventh Circuit found that the unconstitutional twenty-four
hour waiting period could be severed from the act, because the
amending of the act to add a severability clause evidenced the legis-
lature's intent to keep the constitutional portions of the statute in
effect.242 Furthermore, the remainder of the statute would not be
hampered by the severance.243
Both courts seemed to be concerned with whether severing the
provision would maintain the legislative intent of the remainder of
the statute. The courts were considering different statutory provi-
sions for severability and reached different conclusions on the sever-
ability of their provisions. Severability of specific provisions,
therefore, is one aspect of parental notification statutes that the
Supreme Court needs to address. Lower courts need guidance on
severability of particular portions of notification statutes. The Court
needs to hear both Zbaraz and Hodgson in order to address all of the
parameters of parental notification statutes. The parameters include
the waiting period, the one versus two-parent notification require-
ment and the extent to which guidelines assuring expediency and
anonymity must be set out.
1545. The Zbaraz court noted that the legislature had amended the act to add the
severability clause. It concluded that the Illinois legislature intended the act to go
into effect without the unconstitutional provisions. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1545. The
Hodgson court stated that one of the bill's authors had specifically stated in a hearing
that "parent" was intended to mean both parents, even when divorced. The Hodgson
court concluded that the Minnesota legislature intended to require notification of
both parents. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 24-25.
239. The court cited subdivision five as an example, which states that since per-
formance of an abortion without notice is grounds for a civil action by one who was
denied notification, "[i]f the statute were modified to require notification of only one
parent, then it would be impossible to determine which of the two parents would
have a cause of action. This would be particularly difficult where both parents are
residing together and the pregnant minor is living at home." Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-
5431-MN, slip op. at 24.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 25. '[Tlhis court is ill-suited to determine what alternative the legisla-
ture would employ to remedy the constitutional infirmity in this decision.' " Id
(quoting Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 780-81).
242. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1545.
243. Id. The court stated that removing the words "at least twenty-four hours"
from the statute would not affect the notice requirement, which would not hinder the
statute's goals. Id.
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Both lower courts and the Supreme Court agree that parental noti-
fication prior to a minor's abortion is constitutional. What is not
clear, however, is just how burdensome the states may make their
regulations by manipulating the factors listed above.
The split decision of the Supreme Court in Zbaraz, the vacated
Hodgson decision,Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron,244 and the plu-
rality decision of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologiStS2 4
5 all demonstrate the lack of agreement in the area of
abortion regulation, and indicate that the articulation of the parame-
ters of parental notification statutes is not in sight. The changing
composition of the Supreme Court makes prediction of the outcome
of future abortion decisions impossible.246 Although the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has enjoined Minnesota's parental notification
statute pending amendment of the statute,247 comparison of the act
with Illinois' and the other existing parental notification statutes
reveals infirmities of the statute beyond the findings of the court of
appeals.
VII. ANALYSIS
The waiting period requirements, judicial bypass provisions and
two-parent consent provisions have not been addressed in the con-
text of parental notification statutes by the United States Supreme
Court.2 48 The statutes at issue in Bellotti II, Ashcroft and Akron that
did address these provisions were consent statutes. Some legisla-
tures have incorporated those requirements into their notification
statutes. Every federal court that has considered a parental notifica-
tion law since Akron has construed Matheson to mandate a judicial al-
ternative to parental notification.249 At present, sixteen states
244. Justice O'Connor stated that Roe's trimester framework "is clearly on a colli-
sion course with itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease,
the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved
further forward to actual childbirth." City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor
further stated that courts do not possess the expertise to review legislative determi-
nations concerning abortion regulation. Id.
245. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986). Thornburgh is the Court's most recent abortion decision.
246. New Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Kennedy have not issued opinions on
any major abortion cases. In addition, the Court is under the new leadership of jus-
tice Rehnquist as chiefjustice. ChiefJustice Rehnquist is generally known to be more
extreme than former Chief Justice Burger.
247. The Hodgson court stated that "[tihejob of rewriting... [the statute] must...
fall to the Legislature, and not to the courts." Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-
MN, slip op. at 25.
248. See supra notes 99-140 and accompanying text.
249. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971, 985 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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require parental consent prior to a minor's abortion.25o Thirteen
states have enacted parental notification statutes.2 51
A comparison of the parental notification and consent statutes,
Supreme Court precedent and Minnesota's own goals for its juvenile
courts2 52 indicate the need for revision of the following portions of
Minnesota's act: the forty-eight hour waiting period, the content of
the judicial bypass provisions and the two-parent notification
provision.
A. The Waiting Period
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
the application of waiting periods to minors after parental consent or
notification. It found the twenty-four hour waiting period imposed
upon adult women in Akron to be unconstitutional because it was
burdensome to women seeking an abortion and it failed to further
any state interest.253 Matheson, the only definitive Supreme Court
ruling to date on a parental notification statute, did not require a
waiting period after notification.254
250. See ALA. CODE § 26-21-1 to -8 (Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010
(1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152-2153 (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West 1986); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1 Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West
Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-53 to 63 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1988);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(c) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (Supp. 1987);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-41-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
251. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (Harrison Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-609
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64 to -67 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 19 8 7 ); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987);
MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-347 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.12 (Anderson 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-304 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 to 16-2F-6 (1985).
252. Minnesota's Juvenile Court Act mandates that judicial proceedings protect a
minor's welfare. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1986).
253. Akron, 462 U.S. at 450-51. The Court viewed the 24 hour waiting period as
"arbitrary and inflexible" and decided that the city failed to demonstrate any legiti-
mate state interest would be furthered by it. The Court found no evidence showing
that, because of the waiting period, the abortion procedure would be performed
more safely and was unconvinced that the purpose of the statute, to give the woman
time to think and make a well-informed decision, was a legitimate state interest. The
Court appeared to agree with the plaintiffs' position that the waiting period would be
a burden in that it would increase the cost of obtaining an abortion by requiring two
trips to the abortion facility, and the resulting delay from scheduling difficulties
would increase the risk of abortion. Id.
254. Maltheson, 450 U.S. at 413. In Matheson, the Utah statute at issue required the
physician to "[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom
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Of the thirteen states with parental notification statutes, six re-
quire a twenty-four hour waiting period between actual notice and
the abortion.255 One state, in addition to Minnesota, requires a
forty-eight hour waiting period.256 The remaining five states do not
contain a waiting period requirement.257 None of the current stat-
utes that require parental consent prior to a minor's abortion con-
tain waiting period provisions.
Virtually all lower courts determining the constitutionality of wait-
ing periods after parental consent or notification have found that
portion of the statute to be unconstitutional.25 8 These courts found
the waiting periods unconstitutional because they "place[] a direct
and substantial burden on women who seek an abortion" and the
"burden is the same for minors as for adults . *"259
the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she
is married." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
255. See IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64, § 4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1597(2)(A) (1980); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-347(1) (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(i) (Ander-
son 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(a) (1985).
256. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(d) (1982).
257. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (Harrison Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 20-103(a) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(l)(b) (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.255(1) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978).
258. See, e.g., Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1143 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("the state cannot require that an abortion be delayed once notification
has been effected upon a minor's parents"); Planned Parenthood League of Massa-
chusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1014-16 (1st Cir. 1981) (promoting informed
decisions insufficient justification to burdens of time, money, travel and work sched-
ules); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1348 (D.N.D. 1980) (48 hour waiting pe-
riod held to be a direct and substantial burden on a woman's fundamental right to
terminate her pregnancy); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 212 (E.D.La.
1980) (waiting period may result in trimester shifts).
The statute construed in Ashcroft originally contained a 48 hour waiting period,
which was deemed unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. How-
ever, the state did not appeal the waiting period which was severed from the statute.
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 866 (8th
Cir. 1981), aft'd, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
Only one case was found in which the waiting period was upheld. Wolfe v.
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976). The court held that "given the im-
precision of the trimesters and 'viability,' a delay of 24 hours could not result in a
transition from the first into the second trimester or from the second trimester into
"viability.' " Id. The court also referred to the emergency situation exemption if the
woman's life was in imminent peril as a result of the waiting period. Id. This part of
the opinion was overruled by the Sixth Circuit in Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1208 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
259. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1537, citing Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 642 (burden resulting
from waiting period combined with scheduling factors to increase the risk and cost of
the abortion); Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1143 (burden described as the increased cost of
requiring two trips to the clinic, noting that few minors have significant amounts of
money independent of their parents' control); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 785
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While the consensus indicates disfavor for waiting periods, legisla-
tures are split between a twenty-four hour waiting period and no
waiting period at all. Both lower courts and the Supreme Court
agree that waiting periods are burdensome to the adult or minor
seeking an abortion. Even if the twenty-four hour provision is up-
held by the Supreme Court, Minnesota should amend its forty-eight
hour waiting period to conform to the current consensus and require
a twenty-four hour waiting period or no waiting period at all.
B. The Judicial Bypass Provision
In Bellotti II, the United States Supreme Court held that if states
require one or both parents' consent before a minor may obtain an
abortion, they must also provide an alternate procedure whereby ju-
dicial authorization of the abortion may be obtained.260 This judicial
alternative to parental notification "must assure that a resolution of
the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with
anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportu-
nity for an abortion to be obtained."261 For example, the Missouri
statute that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft allowed the
minor to use her initials in the petition requesting waiver of con-
sent. 26 2 The statute also contained specific time limitations to en-
sure the expedition of appeals.263
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals particularly objected to the
Illinois' statute of guidelines to assure that a minor, in procuring a
waiver of notice, is afforded expeditious and confidential court pro-
ceedings. 264 The court did not object to the guidelines pertaining to
the hearing,265 which guarantee that "in no case shall the court fail
(7th Cir. 1980) (burden described as resulting delay from requiring two trips which
increases risk).
260. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644-51.
261. Id. at 644. See also Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.16 (upholding the requirements
set forth in Bellotti II).
262. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n. 16. Although Bellotti I was a plurality decision, the
Ashcroft and Akron opinions upheld its provisions.
263. The statute reads as follows: "The notice of intent to appeal shall be given
within twenty-four hours from the date of issuance of the order. The record on ap-
peal shall be completed and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the
filing of notice to appeal." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 2(6) (Vernon Supp.
1988).
264. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1539-44. The Seventh Circuit also objected to the fact
that the Illinois Supreme Court Rules do not require an expedited hearing but give
the reviewing court discretion to grant such a hearing. Id. at 1541-42. In Pearson, the
Seventh Circuit held such discretion to be a factor in concluding that the Indiana
Rules of Appellate Procedure did not assure an expeditious hearing on appeal. Pear-
son, 716 F.2d at 1136.
265. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1539.
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to rule within 48 hours of the time of application. ... 266 Instead,
the court objected to the lack of a provision mandating expedition of
the appeal. 267 The court cited the Ashcroft statute as an example of a
statute which does provide adequate guidelines for expediting an ap-
peal because it sets out a specific time limitation.268
The Zbaraz court also objected to the Illinois statute's lack of provi-
sions assuring the minor's anonymity at the hearing and after the
proceedings.269 Although the statute states that all proceedings
under the bypass section must be "confidential," it does not state the
means by which to achieve such confidentiality.270 The Ashcroft
statute, which was found by the Supreme Court to provide sufficient
anonymity, allowed a minor to use her initials on the petition for
waiver of consent.271
In Hodgson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals objected to the
Minnesota act's "substitute notification provisions,"272 because that
section of the statute is not operative unless the act is enjoined or
restrained. 273 However, the court did not discuss the statute's ab-
sence of guidelines assuring anonymity and expedition. The district
court had made findings that, in general, Minnesota courts have es-
tablished procedures that maintain speed 274 and confidentiality, 275
both in the initial hearing and the appeal.
Minnesota's statute does contain language mandating anonymity
and expedition,276 but, like the Illinois statute, it does not contain
266. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65(c) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
267. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1539.
268. Id. at 1540. See supra note 263 for the applicable portion of the Missouri
statute.
269. 763 F.2d at 1543. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-65(c), (e), (f, (g)
(Smith-Hurd 1987) (provisions governing anonymity).
270. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1543.
271. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.16. See also Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1542.
272. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6 (1986).
273. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 20-22.
274. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 777. The district court found that lower courts have
made provisions to hear bypass petitions outside of normal business hours in emer-
gency situations. Id. at 762. The court also found, however, that two to three days
usually elapse between a minor's first contact with the court and the actual hearing
on the petition, which combines with scheduling difficulties to produce an even
longer delay. Id. In addition, some court systems in non-metropolitan areas do not
have a judge who will hear bypass petitions. Id. at 763. The district court concluded
that, while the situation as it stands is burdensome to a minor, it "does not reflect a
systemic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious practica-
ble manner." Id.
275. Id. at 763. The court found that measures taken to assure confidentiality in-
cluded "destroying interview notes, holding hearings in judges' chambers rather
than in open court, and referring to petitioners by first name only." Id. at 763.
276. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6(c)(iii) (1986). The anonymity provision reads
as follows: "Proceedings in the court under this section shall be confidential and
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specific time limitations to assure expedition, nor other provisions,
such as use of initials, to maintain anonymity. Further, the findings
of the district court can be interpreted to mean that too much judi-
cial discretion and not enough expedition enters the bypass process,
despite the district court's conclusions to the contrary. If a time limit
is not specifically set out in the statute, it is up to the court to deter-
mine which cases to hear first.
Four of the sixteen states that require parental consent prior to a
minor's abortion do not contain judicial bypass provisions.277 Seven
of the thirteen notification statutes do not contain judicial bypass
provisions.278 Fortunately, the remaining six notification statutes,
which include Illinois and Minnesota, do contain provisions for judi-
cial alternative to notification.2 79 Twelve of the consent statutes con-
tain bypass provisions.280
The statutes that do contain judicial bypass provisions contain va-
ried safeguards for protection of anonymity. Of the consent statutes,
only three require the minor to use her initials on the petition.2 8 1
The remaining nine consent statutes merely require the proceedings
to be "confidential," but do not state how that should be accom-
shall be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the court may
reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the
pregnant woman." Id.
The expedition requirement reads:
An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any such
pregnant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an
abortion without notification .... Access to the trial court for the pur-
poses of such a petition or motion, and access to the appellate courts
for purposes of making an appeal ... shall be afforded such a pregnant
woman twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6(c)(iv) (1986).
277. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
278. IDAHO CODE § 18-609 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (l)(b)
(1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (B) (Anderson 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-4-202(f) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
279. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114(c) (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(2)
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255, subd. 2 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4 (1985).
280. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4 (Supp. 1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B)(1)
(Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(b) (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(4) (West
Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-55 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 2 (Vernon Supp. 1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1, subd. 2 (Supp. 1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206(c) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1985).
281. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(B) (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 2(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
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plished.282 With respect to the notification statutes, the West Vir-
ginia statute provides for "in camera" bypass proceedings and for
anonymous documentation of the proceeding.283 Nevada allows mi-
nors to use their initials on the petition. 284 Georgia's statute re-
quires the record and appeal to be anonymous.2 8 5 Nebraska merely
requires the courts to "maintain confidentiality as to all
proceedings.'"286
Statutory provisions also vary in the expedition requirement.
Most of the consent statutes set time limits between the actual hear-
ing and the initial petition, 287 and/or from the filing of the appeal
282. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(g), (h) (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(g)
(West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(d), (5), (7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(8) (West Supp. 1987); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3), (6)
(Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1, subd. 3 (Supp. 1987); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3206(f) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1985).
283. "All proceedings held pursuant to this article shall be confidential and the
court shall conduct all proceedings in camera." W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4(d) (1985).
In addition:
All testimony, documents and other evidence presented to the court, as
well as the petition and any orders entered thereon and all records of what-
soever nature and kind relating to the matter shall be sealed by the clerk and
shall not be open to any person except upon order of the court and, then,
only upon good cause being shown therefor. A separate order book for the
purposes of this article shall be maintained by such clerk and shall likewise
be sealed and not open to inspection by any person save upon order of the
court for good cause shown.
Id. § 16-2F-4(e).
284. "The court shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the interview and any
other proceedings held pursuant to this subsection or NRS 442.2555 are confiden-
tial." NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255 (4) (1985). In addition, "[t]he petition must set
forth the initials of the minor .. " NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.2555(2) (1985).
285. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114(d), (e) (Supp. 1987).
286. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(2) (1985).
287. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(e) (Supp. 1987) ("in no case .. shall the court fail to
rule within 72 hours of the time the petition is filed . . ."); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988) ("[t]he hearing shall be set within three days of
the filing of the petition"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(d) (West 1986) ("[tlhe
juvenile court must rule on a petition filed by a pregnant minor ... within ... forty-
eight(48) hours of the filing of the petition"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(d)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) ("in no case shall the court fail to rule within...
72 hours of the time of application .... ); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5( B)(3)
(West Supp. 1988) ("[e]ach application shall be heard ... within forty-eight hours of
the filing thereof"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (Supp. 1987) ("in no case shall
the court fail to rule within . . . 72 hours of the time the application is filed"); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("[a] hearing on the merits of
the petition . . . shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the
petition"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1, subd. 2 (Supp. 1987) ("[alll applications
... shall be heard by the juvenile judge or referee within forty-eight hours . . . of
receipt of the application"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f) (Purdon 1983) ("in no
case shall the court fail to rule within three business days of the date of application").
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until its completion.2 8 8 Three statutes state that the hearings and
appeals take "precedence" over all other actions.289 In states with
notification statutes, West Virginia and Nevada provide statutory
limitations on the length of time between the filing of the petition
and the actual hearing, and set a prescribed time for the court to
render its final decision.290 Nebraska sets limits only on the time the
court takes to issue its final decision.291 Georgia's statute, similar to
Minnesota's and Illinois', contains language projecting expedition
but does not set any time limits.292
Both the Seventh and the Eighth Circuits agree that a bypass pro-
vision is mandatory in parental notification statutes. Minnesota's
statute was deemed unconstitutional for failure to provide a judicial
alternative to notification, even when the statute is not enjoined.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not object to the statute's
288. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(h) (Supp. 1987) ("the record of appeal shall be com-
pleted and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of the notice
of appeal"); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25958(d) (West Supp. 1988) ("[t]hese
procedures .. .shall be set within five court days of the filing of the notice of appeal
..... ); LA  REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(8) (West Supp. 1987) ("[e]ach appeal
shall be heard .. .within forty-eight hours of the filing thereof"); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.028, subd. 2(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("[t]he record on appeal shall be com-
pleted and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice to
appeal"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1, subd. 10 (Supp. 1987) ("[alfter hearing
the matter the supreme court shall issue its decision within forty-eight hours").
289. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A), (C) (West Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1985).
290. NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255, subd. 2 (1985). The Nevada statute provides:
"[Tihe court shall interview the woman at the earliest practicable time, which must
be not more than 2 judicial days after the request is made.... [T]he court shall issue
an order within I judicial day after the interview ...... Id. In addition, "[i]f the
court does not enter an order either authorizing or denying the performance of the
abortion within 1 judicial day after the interview, authorization shall be deemed to
have been granted." Id. § 442.255, subd. 3. Another section provides: "A hearing
on the merits of the petition, on the record, must be held as soon as possible and
within 5 judicial days after the filing of the petition." Id. § 442.2555, subd. 3.
The West Virginia statute provides: "The court shall conduct a hearing upon
the petition without delay, but in no event shall the delay exceed the next succeeding
judicial day . . .and its judgment shall be endorsed by the judge thereof not later
than twenty-four hours following such submission .... " W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4(e)
(1985).
291. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(2) (1985). Nebraska's statute provides: "The
court shall expedite all proceedings filed by a minor pursuant to this subsection and
shall render a decision within twenty-four hours of the initial proceeding on such
petition." Id.
292. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-114(e) (Supp. 1987). Georgia's statute reads: "An
expedited appeal preserving the anonymity of the parties shall be available to any
unemancipated minor to whom the court denies a waiver of notice. The appellate
courts are authorized and requested to issue promptly such rules as are necessary to
preserve the anonymity and to ensure the expeditious disposition of procedures pro-
vided by this Code section." Id.
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lack of explicit requirements to assure anonymity and expediency.
However, any provision addressing a minor's contact with the court
should provide protection for the minor. In addition to enabling the
bypass portion of the act to be effective at all times, Minnesota
should explicitly state in its act the means by which a minor will be
protected when involved in the judicial process.
C. The Two-Parent Notification Provision
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals objected to Minnesota's stat-
utory requirement that a minor always notify both of her parents
before an abortion.293 Minnesota requires notification of both par-
ents if they are both living, but notification of only one parent if the
second one cannot be located or notification of a legal guardian.294
Illinois' statute requires notice to both parents, to a guardian, or to
one parent if the other cannot be found. However, the statute also
contains a provision that minors whose parents are divorced need
only notify the parent with custody of the minor. 295
The United States Supreme Court upheld a two-parent consent
requirement in Bellotti II, but did not rule definitively on the constitu-
tionality of a consent requirement where the parents and the minor
are not living together. 29 6 Of the notification statutes, three states in
addition to Illinois and Minnesota require notification of both par-
ents of the minor, but do not include a divorce provision. 29 7 The
remaining eight statutes require notification of only one parent.29 8
Of the sixteen consent statutes, twelve require the consent of only
293. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 19-20.
294. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 3 (1986).
295. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-64 (a) and (b) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
296. "We are not pursuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining
both parents' consent unconstitutionally burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion
.... At least when the parents are together and the pregnant mother is living at
home, both the father and mother have an interest--one normally supportive-in
helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of a daughter." Bellotti If,
443 U.S. at 649.
297. IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978).
298. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1987) ("such parent or guard-
ian shall furnish an affidavit signed by such parent or guardian"); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1597(2) (1980) ("to one of her parents or guardians"); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103(a) (1987) ("notice to a parent or guardian of the minor");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(b) (1987) ("to a parent, if living or the custodian or
legal guardian"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(1) (1985) ("to one of the parents or the
legal guardian"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255(1) (1985) ("a custodial parent or guard-
ian"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (B)(l)(a)(i) (Anderson 1987) ("to one of the
woman's parents, her guardian, or her custodian"); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(a) (1985)
("notice to one of the parents or to the legal guardian").
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one parent.299 Only four require the consent of both parents, if
living.300
The Eighth Circuit based its objection to the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement on the high divorce rate in Minnesota and the ten-
dency toward violence in dysfunctional families, found by the district
court.3 0 ' The court of appeals reasoned that parental notification
would exacerbate potential family violence and dissuade voluntary
notification of one parent. 302 The court concluded that the state's
interest in promoting family communication would not be furthered
often enough to justify the burden imposed upon the minor woman's
fundamental right.303
It seems that Minnesota could meet the goals of its statute by
either adding a provision for divorced parents or by requiring notifi-
cation of only one parent. The solution would not only be more re-
alistic in light of the numerous single parent homes but would be
less burdensome and more protective of the minor from family
violence.
CONCLUSION
If the state of Minnesota wishes to regulate the activities of minors
more closely than those of adults, it must protect the minor from the
very considerations that make the regulation of juveniles unique.
The state seeks to promote family interaction and parental guidance,
yet it must protect juveniles from potential family conflict. A two-
parent notification requirement is burdensome to many, if not most,
minors. The statute should be amended to require either notifica-
tion of only one parent or to include a provision for divorce.
The juvenile court system is unique in that it is protective of mi-
nors, rather than punitive, as is the adult system. Minors are af-
forded anonymity in record-keeping and reporting of cases.
Minnesota should explicitly add provisions requiring anonymity in
such proceedings to protect minors from public view and
stigmatization.
299. ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(a) (Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3)
(1986); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(a) (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25958(a) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a) (West 1986); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(a) (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(A)(1)
(West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028, subd. 1 (1) (Vernon 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (Purdon 1983); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
300. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(1),(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53(1), (2)(a),
(2)(b) (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.1-03.1, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 1987).
301. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 14-19.
302. Id. at 16-17.
303. Id. at 19-20.
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PARENTAL NOTIFICATION STATUTES
Judicial discretion is also a concern in juvenile proceedings, partic-
ularly in Minnesota. Judicial bypass proceedings are to be com-
pleted promptly due to the nature of abortion. Unless Minnesota's
act explicitly sets forth statutory time limits, the judiciary is afforded
discretion in setting up and completing such hearings.
Any state requiring parental consent before a minor's abortion is
required to provide a judicial bypass provision. Many legislatures
have not extended this requirement to parental notification statutes.
But it seems that any state burdening a minor's fundamental right,
when it does not similarly burden an adult's exercise of the same
right, must provide additional safeguards for minors who must en-
dure the burdens of the court system.
The abortion right, as applied to adult women, is not to be overly
burdensome. Parental consent and notification provisions impose
burdens on minors that do not apply to adults. Minnesota's statute
imposes a requirement in addition to parental notification: a forty-
eight hour waiting period.304 Waiting periods are not allowed for
adults seeking abortions.305 The statute states that proceedings
must be expedient,306 yet it adds two days to the entire process. The
state could accomplish parental notification without imposing a wait-
ing period. The least burdensome means should be implemented to
achieve the state's ends.
Juveniles are people with constitutional rights. The Minnesota
statute burdens a constitutionally protected right. But minors are
presumed to lack the experience and maturity necessary to make de-
cisions as to their own medical care. If Minnesota must burden a
constitutionally protected right in order to protect juveniles from
their own decisions, they are entitled to be shielded from the public.
Perhaps the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in refus-
ing to sever the unconstitutional portions of the statute from the act,
thereby disabling the entire act. Illinois' statute is less burdensome
than Minnesota's statute overall. Illinois has a shorter waiting pe-
riod, a judicial bypass procedure that is in effect even if the statute is
enjoined, and a one parent versus a two-parent notification require-
ment. Minnesota should, at the very least, amend its act to conform
to the Illinois standards or completely put parental notification to
rest.
Laura J. Staples
304. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 2 (1986).
305. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983). See also discussion supra note 67.
306. MINN. STAT. § 144.343, subd. 6(c)(iii) (1986). "Proceedings . . . under this
section . . . shall be given . . . precedence over other pending matters . I..." Id.
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